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ABSTRACT 
 
 
REVIEW OF WHISTLEBLOWING STUDIES IN ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 
EXAMINING CORPORATE INTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWING POLICIES 
 
 
By Lei Gao, Ph.D.  
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of the Doctor of 
Philosophy in Business (Concentration in Accounting) at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2017 
 
  
Director: Alisa Brink, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Accounting, School  
of Business, Department of Accounting 
 
This dissertation consists of three studies. The first study provides a review and synthesis 
of past accounting research regarding factors that influence whistleblowing. Building upon the 
model by Near and Miceli (1995), I summarize experimental accounting studies based on five 
determinants of whistleblowing intentions: characteristics of the whistleblower, characteristics of 
the report recipient, characteristics of the wrongdoer, characteristics of the wrongdoing, and 
characteristics of the organization. Suggested directions for future research of each determinant 
are discussed in this paper.  
The second study is a content analysis to examine the variation of organizations’ internal 
whistleblowing policy, including both the content characteristics of the policy and the linguistic 
characteristics of the policy. In terms of the content characteristics of the whistleblowing policy,  
  
 
vii 
this study focuses on who is covered in the policy, where to report, employees’ responsibility, 
corporate investigation procedures, disciplinary action against the wrongdoer, and anti-retaliation 
policy. In terms of the linguistic characteristics of the internal whistleblowing policy, this study 
focuses on the types of pronouns, the language uncertainty of the policy, and the tone of the policy 
(positive or negative). Furthermore, the overlaps between the content characteristics and the 
linguistic characteristics are also identified.   
The third study is a 2 by 2 between-subjects experiment to investigate the best design of 
companies’ internal whistleblowing policy. By breaking the internal whistleblowing policy into 
the reporting policy (responsibility to report and reporting channel) and the anti-retaliation policy 
(protection against retaliation), the experiment manipulates the type of pronouns for the reporting 
policy (first-person pronoun reporting policy or third-person pronoun reporting policy) and type 
of pronouns for the anti-retaliation policy (first-person pronoun anti-retaliation policy or third-
person pronoun anti-retaliation policy). This study predicts that compared to third-person pronouns, 
first-person pronouns encourage whistleblowing in the reporting policy, but discourage 
whistleblowing in the anti-retaliation policy. The highest reporting intention can be achieved when 
the reporting policy is worded in first-person and the anti-retaliation policy is worded in third-
person.  
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Part One: Whistleblowing Studies in Accounting Research: A Review of Experimental 
Studies on Determinants of Whistleblowing 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The term whistleblowing is derived from a sporting event where the referee blows the 
whistle to stop an illegal or foul play (Qusqas and Kleiner 2001). Researchers from different 
disciplines define whistleblowing in various ways (Erkmen et al. 2012). As discussed by Brennan 
and Kelly (2007), the more widely-accepted and most frequently used definition of whistleblowing 
in accounting research is by Near and Miceli (1985). They define whistleblowing as “the disclosure 
by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under 
the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Near 
and Miceli 1985, 4).  This definition has been adopted by numerous whistleblowing studies (e.g., 
Keenan 2002; King 1997; Miceli and Near 1994, 1997; Miceli et al. 1999; Near et al. 2004; Ayers 
and Kaplan 2005). 
Starting in the 1980s, a number of researchers from many disciplines began to investigate 
ways to promote whistleblowing (Keil et al. 2010). Employee tips are considered the most 
common method of detecting fraud (ACFE 2014; Dyck et al. 2010). However, numerous surveys 
show that not all observed fraud is reported (Hudson Employment Index 2005; Miceli et al. 2008; 
Ethics Resource Center 2012; Ethics Resource Center 2013). The Ethics Resource Center (2013) 
found that 41 percent of employees observed misconduct in their workplace, but out of the 41 
percent of employees who observed misconduct, around 33 percent remained silent. There have 
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been many accounting researchers investigating ways to promote reporting fraudulent accounting 
behavior or auditing misconduct. Providing a systematic review of the extant whistleblowing 
literature in accounting research could help identify gaps in the research investigating the obstacles 
that stop witnesses from blowing the whistle. In this study, I review and summarize accounting 
literature that examines whistleblowing. I first describe the whistleblowing model used in this 
study in Section II. Section III reviews and synthesizes the literature on each determinant of 
whistleblowing. I present overall conclusions in Section IV. 
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II. WHISTLEBLOWING MODEL 
 
Near and Miceli (1995) propose a model of effective whistleblowing by focusing on 
terminating the wrongdoing. They propose that there are five primary factors that influence 
whistleblowing effectiveness: characteristics of the whistleblower, characteristics of the report 
recipient, characteristics of the wrongdoer, characteristics of the wrongdoing, and characteristics 
of the organization. 
Near and Miceli (1995) define effectiveness of whistleblowing as “the extent to which the 
questionable or wrongful practice is terminated at least partly because of whistleblowing and 
within a reasonable time frame” (681).  Whistleblowers report the wrongdoing with the purpose 
of terminating the wrongdoing. Their intention to blow the whistle is closely related to whether 
they believe the wrongdoing will be stopped (Near et al. 2004). The model by Near and Miceli 
(1995) was developed from the perspective of terminating the wrongdoing and it is broader and 
covers most of the relevant parties involved in a whistleblowing scenario in accounting. This 
model has been used extensively to explain witnesses’ reporting intentions. For example, based on 
the model proposed by the Near and Miceli (1995), Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) 
explore the correlation of whistleblowing intentions, actions, and retaliation. Curtis and Taylor 
(2009) classify the five components of effective whistleblowing into personal characteristics and 
organizational variables and investigate the influence of identity disclosure, situational context, 
and personal characteristics on witnesses’ whistleblowing intentions.   
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As shown in Figure 1, building upon the Near and Miceli (1995) model, I review and 
summarize whistleblowing accounting literature based on the five determinants of effective 
whistleblowing, namely characteristics of the whistleblower; characteristics of the report recipient, 
characteristics of the wrongdoer, characteristics of the wrongdoing, and characteristics of the 
organization.1       
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Researchers have also provided other models investigating whistleblowing intentions. For example, Hooks et al. 
(1994) develop a whistleblowing model in the context of the internal control and external audit functions of fraud 
detection. They illustrate the roles of internal control and external audit in encouraging unethical behavior reporting. 
Schultz et al. (1993) propose and test a model illustrating that a person’s willingness to report unethical behavior is 
determined by the perceived seriousness of the act, personal responsibility for reporting, and personal cost of 
reporting. Extending this model, Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) show that auditors’ reporting intentions are 
influenced by their perceptions of the seriousness of the act, personal responsibility of reporting, personal cost of 
reporting and commitment to the accounting profession. Gundlach et al. (2003) develop a social information 
processing framework by integrating the power, justice, and prosocial literature on whistleblowing, and they argue 
that individuals' attributions and responsibility judgments for wrongdoing, as well as their cost-benefit analyses of 
acting, influence their emotions and decisions to report the wrongdoing. 
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III. DETERMINANTS OF WHISTLEBLOWING 
 
Characteristics of the Whistleblower  
The first determinant of effective whistleblowing is characteristics of the whistleblower. 
Miceli et al. (2008) classified personal predictors of whistleblowing into personality characteristics, 
moral judgment, and demographic characteristics. Personality characteristics or dispositional 
characteristics are internal factors that cause an event or behavior. Moral judgment refers to the 
ability to judge one's own and others' behavior as right or wrong (Li et al. 2014). Demographic 
characteristics involve factors such as age, race, sex, working experience and so on.  
Whistleblowers are individuals who witness certain unethical behavior and speak up to an 
appropriate person with the purpose of correcting the wrongdoing. Apart from external situational 
factors, individuals’ decision-making processes are heavily influenced by their personality 
characteristics, moral judgement, and their demographic characteristics (Miceli et al. 2008; Bartels 
et al. 2015). Thus, it is important to understand how these characteristics contribute to the 
likelihood of reporting unethical conduct. 
Prior Literature 
Personality Characteristics. Prior literature has examined some elements of 
characteristics of whistleblowers that impact reporting in accounting setting. In terms of 
personality characteristics and moral judgement, Curtis and Taylor (2009) look at the witness’ 
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whistleblowing in public accounting firms from the perspectives of individuals’ locus of control 
and ethical style. Locus of control refers to how one person attributes events to either internal 
factors (e.g., internal hard work) or external factors (e.g., luck).  Ethical style describes an 
individual’s approach of evaluating ethical dilemmas, and White (2007) classifies ethical styles as 
either caring or judging. Curtis and Taylor (2009) employ a within-subjects scenario-based survey 
method and find that auditors with an internal locus of control and auditors who exhibit a judging 
ethical style are more likely to report unethical conduct.  
Dalton and Radtke (2013) examine the joint effect of Machiavellianism and ethical 
environment on whistleblowing. By conducting a between-subjects experiment with MBA 
students, they find that Machiavellianism is negatively related to whistle-blowing. 
Machiavellianism refers to a term that some social and personality psychologists use to describe a 
person’s tendency to deceive others to achieve personal goals (Christie and Geis 1970).  
Brink et al. (2015a) investigate whether the witnesses’ personality traits and ethical 
position are associated with their whistleblowing intention. They use the Big Five Factors 
(extroversion, openness to experience, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and agreeableness) 
developed by John et al. (1991) and updated by John et al. (2008) to measure personality. By 
conducting a between-subjects experiment with upper level accounting students, they find a 
positive relation between the presence of higher levels of the alpha and beta meta-traits and 
whistle-blowing behaviors. The alpha trait consists of agreeableness, conscientiousness, and 
emotional stability (neuroticism). Beta traits are traits that indicates self-development and 
preservation. Building on the Forsyth (1992) model of ethical orientation, which states that 
individuals with higher levels of idealism will have a defined set of behaviors whereas more 
relativistic individuals would not have a defined set of behaviors, they predict and find that 
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individuals with idealistic ethical position are more likely to report than individuals with 
relativistic ethical position.   
Demographic Characteristics. Most experimental studies collect participants’ 
demographic information, such as age, gender and work experience. In general, the results show 
that years of work experience, gender, and type of organization are not significantly associated 
with their reporting intention (e.g., Kaplan et al. 2011; Seifert et al. 2010; Brink et al. 2013).  
Some studies use demographic variables as the variables of interest and test how 
demographic variables interact with other variables (e g., Kaplan et al. 2009; Liyanarachchi and 
Adler 2011; Erkmen et al. 2014). Kaplan et al. (2009) examine the interaction between witness’ 
gender and anonymousness of reporting channel on individuals’ intentions to report fraudulent 
financial reporting. They conduct an experiment with evening MBA students and find that female 
participants’ reporting intentions are higher than male participants only under the anonymous 
reporting channel condition.   
Liyanarachchi and Adler (2011) recruit Australian accountants to participate in a quasi-
experimental survey investigating the effect of accountants’ age, gender and retaliation on their 
whistleblowing intentions. In their study they vary the degree of retaliation through manipulation 
and find a significant three-way interaction among participants’ gender, age and retaliation. They 
find that among early career accountants, male accountants are more likely than female 
accountants to blow the whistle. When accountants are 45 years old and above, they respond to 
retaliation differently depending on their gender. Specifically, female accountants’ reporting 
intention in this age group tends to decline as the retaliation threat increases. In contrast, the change 
in retaliation threat has little impact on male accountants’ reporting intentions.  
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Erkmen et al. (2014) conduct a survey with accounting professionals in Turkey to examine 
the effect of witness’ age, gender and types of wrongdoing on whistleblowing intentions. They 
find female accounting professionals are more likely to blow the whistle than male accounting 
professionals when the fraud involves fake invoices, and older accounting professionals are more 
likely to blow the whistle than younger professionals when the fraud involves misclassification of 
sales and profits.  
In summary, accounting researchers investigating characteristics of whistleblowers often 
collect witnesses’ demographic information such as gender, age, working experience, etc. These 
demographic variables can sometimes interact with other variables, such as degree of retaliation 
or reporting channel, to influence reporting intentions. Accounting studies also measure 
whistleblowers’ personality characteristics, such as locus of control. Personality characteristics 
play an important role a person’s decision making process. Personality traits, such as locus of 
control and Machiavellianism, influence individuals’ decisions to report unethical behavior (see 
summary in Table 1.1).  
[Insert Table 1.1 Here] 
Directions for Future Research  
Studies indicate that apprenticeship training (work-based secondary education) can alter 
some aspects of personality. For example, Bolli and Hof (2014) find that apprenticeship training 
can reduce neuroticism and increase agreeableness and conscientiousness. Prior research indicates 
that certain personality traits are associated with a lower likelihood of reporting unethical conduct. 
Thus, it would be interesting to explore what external factors, such as training, would effectively 
alter the personality traits that are associated with low whistleblowing intentions.    
Characteristics of the Report Recipient  
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Characteristics of the report recipient involves two categories. First, it involves the 
characteristics of the actual person who receives the report, such as the report recipient’s power 
status and credibility (Near and Miceli 1995). Second, it involves the characteristics of the 
reporting channel, such as the administration of the reporting channel. 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires that public companies maintain an anonymous 
reporting channel for whistleblowers. There is no specific guideline as to how the reporting 
channel should be administered (SEC 2003, 20). Some firms have the reporting hotline 
administered by internal auditors while others choose to have it administered by external auditors. 
The characteristics of the report recipient is an important factor that influences whether the 
witnesses believe that the report will handled properly and thus will subsequently influence their 
reporting intentions.  
Prior Literature 
Characteristics of the Report Recipient. In terms of the studies investigating the 
characteristics of the actual person who receives the report, Kaplan et al. (2010) conduct an 
experiment by manipulating whether the report recipient is the supervisor’s supervisor or an 
internal auditor, and whether there is existence of an unsuccessful social confrontation when 
meeting with the transgressor to discuss the fraud. Using a 2 by 2 between-subjects experiment 
with MBA students, they find that the witnesses’ reporting intentions to the supervisor’s supervisor 
are stronger than to an internal auditor when there is an unsuccessful social confrontation with the 
supervisor.  However, reporting intentions to the supervisor’s supervisor are not stronger than to 
an internal auditor when there is no social confrontation.  
Kaplan et al. (2011) take a step further to investigate whether the potential information 
recipient’s inquiry enhances reporting intentions or not, and they vary the source of inquiry as 
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either internal auditor or external auditor. The results show that participants’ whistleblowing 
intentions to an inquiring auditor are stronger than their whistleblowing intentions to a non-
inquiring auditor, and their whistleblowing intention to an internal auditor are stronger than their 
intentions to an external auditor.  
Characteristics of the Reporting Channel. In terms of the characteristics of the reporting 
channel, some researchers look at whether the reporting channel is anonymous or not, and others 
investigate whether the reporting hotline is administered internally or externally. With an internally 
administered hotline, the report recipient is an employee of the company, whereas with an 
externally administered hotline the report recipient belongs to an independent organization outside 
the company.  
Several studies investigate the effect of anonymous reporting channel. Kaplan and Schultz 
(2007) conduct an experiment and find that the existence of an anonymous channel reduces the 
likelihood of reporting to non-anonymous channels. Curtis and Taylor (2009) conduct a survey 
with auditors to examine their whistleblowing intentions under three forms of identity disclosure, 
namely disclosed identity format, anonymous format, and protected identity format. Protected 
identity means the witnesses’ identity is known to those who must investigate, but not to the 
perpetrator. They find that reporting intentions are significantly lower under a disclosed identity 
format, and there was no significant difference in reporting intention between anonymous and 
protected identity formats. Kaplan et al. (2012) further investigate witnesses’ preference of 
reporting channels with an experiment. They find witnesses’ reporting intentions to an anonymous 
channel is higher than to a non-anonymous channel only when a previous whistleblowing outcome 
is negative.  
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Several additional studies investigate the effect of whether the reporting channel is 
administered internally or externally. Kaplan et al. (2009) examine intentions to report a fraudulent 
act to an anonymous reporting hotline that is administered either internally by company personnel 
or externally by a third-party provider. They find that the reporting intentions to the internal hotline 
are significantly higher than to the external hotline. Zhang et al. (2013) argue that an internal 
reporting channel might not be always better than an external reporting channel at encouraging 
whistleblowing. By conducting an experiment with M.B.A students, they find that participants’ 
reporting intentions to an external hotline are higher when the organization has a history of poor 
responsiveness to whistleblowing and when participants are low on the proactivity scale. Proactive 
behavior is defined by Grant (2000,436) as ‘taking initiative in improving current circumstances”.   
In summary, prior studies investigating the characteristics of the report recipient focus on 
the following categories: the characteristics of the actual person who receives the report and the 
characteristics of the reporting channel (see summary in Table 1.2).  Studies show that report 
recipients’ power influences witnesses’ reporting intentions under certain conditions, such as when 
there was unsuccessful social confrontation with the supervisor. Certain report recipients’ 
behavioral characteristics also influence witnesses’ reporting intention, such as recipients’ inquiry 
of unethical behaviors.  In terms of the reporting channel, witnesses prefer an anonymous reporting 
channel over a non-anonymous reporting channel, especially when a previous reporting outcome 
was negative. Witnesses in general prefer to report internally first before reporting externally. 
However internal reporting is not always preferred, and witnesses’ reporting intentions to an 
external hotline are higher when organizational response is poor and when witnesses are low on 
the proactivity scale.  
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[Insert Table 1.2 Here] 
Direction for Future Research  
Corporations prefer witnesses to report unethical behavior internally, as external reporting 
brings reputation damage and high litigation risk (Berry 2004; Davidson and Worrell 1988; 
Laczniak and Murphy 1991). As documented above, whether an internally administered channel 
is preferred or not depends on environmental conditions (Zhang et al. 2013). For example, an 
internally administered reporting channel might not be viewed as a good place to report if the 
wrongdoing is unethical pro-organizational behaviors, because the report recipient might be less 
likely to correct an unethical behavior that is beneficial to the company.  Future research could 
further explore under what conditions one reporting channel is better than others by examining the 
reporting channel’s interactive effect with the primary beneficiary of the wrongdoing. For example, 
when the fraud is for the wrongdoer’s personal benefits, witness’ reporting intention to the 
internally administered hotline might be higher than to the externally administered hotline because 
such wrongdoing provides no benefits to the company and the company may be more likely to 
take corrective action.  On the other hand, if the wrongdoing is unethical pro-organizational 
behavior, the witness might be more likely to report to an external channel because the pro-
organizational wrongdoing provides certain benefits to the company and the company might not 
take corrective action after receiving the report.  
Under SOX, the reporting channels are established by audit committees (SEC 2003, 20). It 
is also important to explore the effects of audit committee quality on encouraging reporting 
unethical behaviors. Stronger audit committees, which have more external members and meet 
more regularly, may indicate that there is higher possibility of terminating the wrongdoing when 
it is reported. There are a number of studies in the auditing literature investigating the relation 
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between the audit committee qualities and earnings manipulation. Accounting literature can be 
extended by bridging the audit committee literature and whistleblowing literature.  
Characteristics of the Wrongdoer  
Prior Literature 
In terms of the characteristics of the wrongdoer, Near and Miceli (1995) focus on the 
wrongdoers’ power and credibility. As illustrated in their model, the characteristics influencing 
wrongdoers’ power include their position in hierarchy, pay grade, professional status, education 
level, etc.  Characteristics influencing wrongdoers’ credibility include perceived motives, 
performance, etc.  As stated by Near and Miceli (1995), the wrongdoers’ power and credibility 
influence whether the company will take corrective actions against the wrongdoer and wrongdoing. 
With the purpose of terminating the wrongdoing, the witnesses assess the wrongdoers’ power and 
credibility before reporting the wrongdoing. Thus, the wrongdoers’ characteristics are important 
factors that influence the witnesses’ whistleblowing intentions.  
The Wrongdoers’ Power. Taylor and Curtis (2013) investigate the auditors’ likelihood of 
reporting observations of colleagues’ unethical behavior by varying whether the wrongdoer is a 
co-worker or supervisor and whether the previous organizational response is strong or not. They 
find that auditors are more likely to blow the whistle when the wrongdoer is a co-worker than 
when he is the supervisor only when there is no previous organizational response to unethical 
behaviors. If the prior organizational response is strong, auditors are more likely to report the 
supervisor than the co-worker.  
The Wrongdoers’ Credibility. Kaplan (1995) investigates the effect of the wrongdoer’s 
work performance on auditor reporting intentions upon discovery of unethical conduct. In his study, 
the unethical conduct is premature sign-off of an audit procedure, and the wrongdoer’s work 
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history is manipulated as either good or poor. He finds that the witnesses’ reporting intention are 
significantly stronger when the wrongdoer has poor work history. Robertson et al. (2011) extend 
Kaplan (1995) by examining the effects of a wrongdoer-auditor’s performance and likeability 
reputation on fellow auditors’ intentions to report. Through an experiment with auditors, they find 
that reporting intentions are lower when the wrongdoer has a good performance reputation and 
when the wrongdoer is more likeable. They find that the reporting intention is the lowest when the 
wrongdoer is both likeable and has good performance reputation.  
In summary, empirical studies examining the effect of wrongdoers’ characteristics on 
whistleblowing are limited. In general these studies find that the witnesses’ reporting intention is 
lower when the wrongdoer is credible with good work performance and high power in the 
organization. Furthermore, strong prior organizational responses help increase the reporting 
intentions when the wrongdoer has high power (see summary in Table 1.3). 
[Insert Table 1.3 Here] 
Directions for future research   
First, companies want their employees to have credibility and good work performance. 
However, when such employees also engage in unethical behaviors, the witnesses’ reporting 
intentions are low. Future research could investigate variables that interact with wrongdoers’ 
credibility and work performance to encourage reporting on employees who commit unethical 
conduct but have good work performance.  
Second, extant whistleblowing literature investigating wrongdoer characteristics have been 
focusing on single wrongdoer committing the unethical activity alone. In reality, most of the major 
organizational frauds over the past decade, such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and HealthSouth, 
have been committed through the collusion of multiple employees involving the CEO, CFO and 
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others (Free and Murphy 2014). Free and Murphy (2016, 19) state that “in major accounting frauds 
(see, e.g., COSO 2010) or complex identity frauds, for example, it is unlikely that any one 
individual has the resources, access and capacity to construct a sophisticated fraud without the 
assistance of others.”  Scholars suggest that more research should be done on fraudulent acts 
involving multiple employees. (e.g., Hochstetler 2001; van Mastrigt and Farrington 2011). Free 
(2016) reviews popular frameworks used to examine fraud and suggests three areas where there is 
considerable scope for academic research. One of the areas he suggests for further exploration is 
the nature of collusion in fraud. Future accounting research on whistleblowing can incorporate co-
offending situations and investigate how multiple wrongdoers interact with other variables 
influencing witnesses’ whistleblowing intentions.  
Third, whistleblowing research investigating wrongdoer’s characteristics focuses on a 
wrongdoer who is in the same organization as the witness. It is getting more and more common 
for companies to outsource part of the organizational functions to other companies. As discussed 
by Ayers and Kaplan (2005), the impact on reporting intentions is not clear when the wrongdoer 
is a non-employee. In such a situation, reporting intentions might be higher since witnesses may 
feel that retaliation possibility will be minimal when reporting on consultants. However, 
organizational employees may believe that it is not their responsibility to report the wrongdoing 
of consultants, making reporting less likely. Ayers and Kaplan (2005) test a whistleblowing model 
under the setting that the wrongdoer is a consultant of the company. In their study, the wrongdoer 
is a non-employee across treatments, thus wrongdoer is not a between-subjects variable. As a result, 
their study doesn’t answer the question of whether there is a significant reporting difference 
between an employee wrongdoer and non-employee wrongdoer. Future research can 
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experimentally manipulate whether the wrongdoer is an employee or non-employee to examine 
how this impacts witnesses’ reporting intentions.  
Characteristics of the Wrongdoing   
Near and Miceli (1995) separate the characteristics of the wrongdoing into three 
dimensions: the organization’s dependence on the wrongdoing, the credibility of the 
whistleblower’s evidence, and the legality of the alleged wrongdoing.  Each of the three dimension 
influences witnesses’ perception of whether the report will be handled properly or not. As proposed 
by Near and Miceli (1995), the greater the dependence of the organization on the wrongdoing, the 
less likely the company will take corrective actions; the more convincing that wrongdoing has 
occurred, the more effective the whistleblowing will be; and the less ambiguous that the 
wrongdoing is illegal, the more effective the whistleblowing will be.   
Prior literature 
Organization’s Dependence on the Wrongdoing. In terms of the organization’s 
dependence on the wrongdoing, Kaplan and Schultz (2007) vary the primary beneficiary of the 
wrongdoing within-subjects and examine witnesses’ decisions to report and choice of reporting 
channel. They ask participants to indicate their reporting intention under three case scenarios: 
financial statement fraud, theft, and a non-fraudulent case. Financial statement fraud is considered 
benefiting both the company and the perpetrator; while the theft case benefits only the perpetrator 
and harms the company. The third non-fraudulent case involves a case of an employee’s poor work 
quality being discovered by another employee. These three cases represent a variety of 
questionable acts that exist in companies. They find that reporting intentions are lower under 
financial statement fraud than under the theft case condition. Also, using a within-subjects design, 
Robinson et al. (2012) investigate the effect of the type of fraudulent act on whistleblowing 
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intention by looking at whether the fraud is theft or financial statement fraud.  They find lower 
whistleblowing intentions for financial statement fraud than theft, and whistleblowing intentions 
are lower for immaterial than material financial statement fraud.  
Kaplan et al. (2009) examine whether witnesses’ reporting intentions are influenced by the 
following two types of wrongdoing: fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets. 
They find that there are higher reporting intentions for misappropriation of assets compared to 
fraudulent financial reporting, but only when the reporting channel is anonymous. Kaplan et al. 
(2011) further examine the interactive relation among types of fraudulent acts, auditor inquiry, and 
reporting recipient. They do not find a systematic difference between misappropriation of assets 
and fraudulent financial reporting, nor does the type of fraudulent act interact with whether the 
auditor engages in inquiry or the report recipient (e.g., internal versus external auditor).  
Credibility of the Whistleblower’s Evidence.  Brink et al. (2013) conduct a 2 by 2 
between-subjects experiment with MBA students. They investigate evidence strength and internal 
rewards on witnesses’ reporting choice between internal reporting and external reporting to the 
SEC. They find that the likelihood of reporting internally is greater than to the SEC. When 
evidence is strong, internal rewards increase reporting to SEC; when evidence is weak the presence 
of an internal incentive decreases SEC reporting intentions. Brink et al. (2015b) investigate the 
interaction between evidence strength and the bystander effect. They find that when the evidence 
is strong, individuals with sole knowledge are more likely to report than when others are aware of 
the fraudulent act (the bystander effect). However, results indicate no bystander effect when 
evidence of fraud is weak. 
Legality of the Alleged Wrongdoing. The only study related to this concept is Brink et al. 
(2015a). They conduct an experiment by manipulating different materiality levels of the 
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wrongdoing and examine the subsequent effects on respondents. In the high materiality scenario, 
the inappropriate revenues represent ten percent of the annual revenues of the firm. In the low 
materiality scenario, revenues represent one percent of the annual revenues. The results show that 
the reporting intentions are lower when the fraud is low in materiality.  
In summary, accounting studies investigating the organization’s dependence on the 
wrongdoing have mixed results (see summary in Table 1.4). Studies from Kaplan and Schultz 
(2007) and Robinson et al. (2012) examine the primary beneficiary of frauds using within-subjects 
design. They find that witnesses are less likely to report financial statement fraud than theft. Other 
studies vary the fraudulent acts as either financial statement fraud or misappropriation of assets 
between subjects and they do not find a significant reporting difference between the two. It is 
important to note that the actual wrongdoing behavior and the organization’s dependence on the 
wrongdoing are different concepts. In these studies, it is difficult to conclude whether the results 
are due to the difference of the actual wrongdoing behavior (manipulating financial statement vs. 
stealing from the company) or difference in whether the organization benefits from the wrongdoing. 
In terms the credibility of evidence and the legality of the unethical act, there are limited 
experimental studies investigating these two concepts. Within the limited studies, results show that 
stronger evidence strength and high materiality level increase the witnesses’ reporting intentions.  
[Insert Table 1.4 Here] 
 
Direction for future research  
Free (2015) reviews popular frameworks used to examine fraud and suggests three areas 
where there is considerable scope for academic research. One of the areas is rationalization of 
fraudulent behaviors by offenders. Wrongdoings that are conducted in the name of benefiting the 
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organization are often used as rationalization for committing fraud. Future studies can examine the 
effect of rationalization on witnesses’ reporting intentions by varying the purpose of the fraudulent 
act.  
Many corporations’ whistleblowing standards require reporting the misconduct in “good 
faith,” a term that every employee is apt to understand differently (Heard and Miller 2006). Some 
companies state that the whistleblower is subject to disciplinary actions if not reporting in good 
faith (Heard and Miller 2006). Reporting a misconduct that lacks convincing evidence may lead 
to questions regarding whether the reporting is in good faith or not. This may discourage the 
witnesses from reporting the questionable act. Future research can investigate whether a lack of 
evidence is related to questions of acting in good faith, and how such questions might influence 
reporting intentions.  
Characteristics of the organization   
From the perspective of encouraging whistleblowing, characteristics of the organization 
can be classified into the following categories: appropriateness of whistleblowing, organizational 
climate, and organizational structure (Near and Miceli 1995). Appropriateness of whistleblowing 
refers to the degree to which whistleblowing is considered part of one’s regular responsibility. 
Organizational climate refers to the ethical climate, which can encourage whistleblowing or 
discourage whistleblowing. In terms of organizational structure, one key variable is the level of 
bureaucracy.  
As discussed by Near and Miceli (1995), the organization’s structure and climate can 
reflect and influence its employees’ resistance to change. The witnesses’ whistleblowing intentions 
are influenced by their perception of organizational support and whether the company is willing 
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to change the wrongful acts. Thus it is important to investigate how the characteristics of the 
organization can improve whistleblowing.  
Prior literature 
Appropriateness of Whistleblowing. In terms of the appropriateness of whistleblowing, 
one key factor is the company’s whistleblowing policy. A whistleblowing policy may include the 
witnesses’ responsibility of reporting, reporting channels and protection against retaliation 
(Hassink et al. 2007). Wainberg and Perreault (2016) conduct an experiment with graduate 
students by varying the existence of an explicit whistleblower anti-retaliation policy. They find 
that a vivid anti-retaliation policy may actually have the opposite of the intended effect and lower 
whistleblower’ reporting intentions because it increases the salience of retaliatory threats.  
 Organizational Climate. Organizational climate on whistleblowing can be influenced by 
many factors, such as the organization’s response to prior whistleblowing incidents, ethical 
environment, and internal rewards for whistleblowing. Zhang et al. (2013) investigate the 
interactive effects of previous whistleblowing outcomes, reporting channel, and personal 
proactivity scale. They vary the outcome for the previous whistleblower as either positive or 
negative. They find that when organizations have a history of negative outcomes for previous 
whistleblowers and when witnesses are low on the proactivity scale, the witnesses are less likely 
to report to internal hotlines and more likely to report via external hotline.   
Taylor and Curtis (2013) conduct an experiment in an audit environment by manipulating 
whether the organization takes responsive actions against ethics violations and whether the 
wrongdoer is a supervisor or a peer of the witness. They find that when organizational response is 
strong, the witnesses are more likely to report to supervisors than peers. Without strong 
organizational response, they are more likely to report to peers than supervisors.  
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Dalton and Radtke (2013) examine the joint effect of Machiavellianism and ethical 
environment on whistleblowing. They manipulate the organization’s ethical environment by 
varying whether the company’s ethical standards are emphasized or not. They find that emphasis 
on ethical environment increases witnesses’ reporting, especially when the witnesses are high in 
Machiavellianism. Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008) conduct a survey with internal auditors to examine 
whether a cash reward or employment contracts have an impact on auditors’ whistleblowing 
intentions. The results indicate that internal auditors are more likely to report wrongdoing when a 
cash reward or employment contract reward is provided.  
Brink et al. (2013) further investigate how internal rewards influence witnesses’ choice of 
reporting channel. They find a greater likelihood of reporting internally than to the SEC. Their 
results show that when evidence is strong, internal rewards increase reporting to SEC; and when 
evidence is weak the presence of an internal incentive decreases SEC reporting intention. Seifert 
et al. (2010) apply the theory of organizational justice to the design of whistleblowing policies and 
procedures. They manipulate the organizational procedural justice (e.g., consistency of procedures 
and freedom from bias in carrying out procedures), distributive justice (e.g., resolutions are 
perceived as fair), and interactional justice (e.g. individuals are treated with dignity and respect). 
They conduct an experiment with internal auditors and management accountants and find that 
organizational procedural justice, distributive justice, and interactional justice increase the 
likelihood that an organizational accountant would internally report financial statement fraud. 
 Organizational Structure. Brennan and Kelly (2007) examine the relation between audit 
firms’ organizational structures and trainee auditors’ whistleblowing intentions. They conduct a 
survey of a group of trainee accountants in the UK and measure the participants’ response to their 
organization’s formal structures, training, and whistleblowing policy.  They find that having 
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formal structures is positively associated with employees’ reporting intentions. Training offered 
by the organization increases employees’ reporting confidence. 
Lowe et al. (2013) investigate the effect of a financial sub-certification procedure in an 
organization on witnesses’ reporting intentions. Financial sub-certification procedure means the 
witnesses’ supervisors sign and certify that there is no fraud on the financial statements. Lowe et 
al. (2013) argue that the witnesses with knowledge of a superior who committed a fraudulent act 
and certified that there is no fraud have lower reporting intentions. Using an experimental approach 
with MBA students, they manipulate two between-participant variables: (1) the presence or 
absence of sub-certification by the transgressor and (2) the timing of fraud discovery, either before 
or after the reports have been filed with the SEC. They find that when sub-certification is present, 
witnesses’ reporting intentions were diminished compared to when sub-certification is absent. 
Timing of the discovery of the fraudulent act has no effect on reporting intentions.  
In summary, appropriateness of whistleblowing is closely related to responsibility of 
reporting. There are limited studies investigating what organizational characteristics improve the 
responsibility of reporting. Researchers find that prior organizational response, ethical 
environment, internal reward, and organizational justice all, to some extent, encourage 
whistleblowing. In terms of organizational structure, studies show that the formal structure is 
positively associated with employees’ reporting intentions. Asking supervisors to certify the 
financial statements lowers the witnesses’ reporting intentions when there is financial statement 
fraud (see summary in Table 1.5). 
[Insert Table 1.5 Here] 
Directions for future research  
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A company’s internal whistleblowing policy provides detailed explanations and guidance 
for employees who witness unethical behaviors. Hassink et al. (2007) conduct a content analysis 
of whistleblowing policies of leading European countries and find that there is variation of content 
included in companies’ whistleblowing policies. For example, firms have different reporting 
channels. Fifty percent of the sample provide detailed contact information of where to report, and 
78 percent of the sample mentioned that the whistleblower’s identity will be kept anonymous. 
Apart from variation of actual content, there is also language variation when firms describe their 
whistleblowing policy. The tone of language used in corporate communication with employees 
can provide different direction to the potential whistleblowers (Schwartz 2002). Use of negative 
tone language, such as “don’t do x” seems to provide clearer direction than the use of positive tone 
(Schwartz 2002). Bethoux et al. (2007) and Logsdon and Wood (2005) document that employees 
can recognize the value assigned by the corporation to ethics and the reporting of wrongdoing 
through the language the company uses. Future research could conduct controlled experiments to 
investigate the effects of different language features in whistleblowing policies on the employees’ 
perceived responsibility of reporting and their reporting intentions.  
Another organizational characteristic worth exploring is the confidentiality agreement 
existing between employees and organizations. The U.S. Department of Justice and Securities and 
Exchange Commission have used whistleblower bounties to encourage employees to report 
corporate wrongdoing to the SEC. However, it is a common practice for firms to sign 
confidentiality agreements with employees to prevent employees from disclosing sensitive data to 
unauthorized parties. As discussed by Strassberg and Harrington (2015, 1), it was inevitable that 
“employers, employees and government lawyers would conflict on the use of confidentiality to 
protect sensitive corporate information.” In April 2015, the SEC filed an enforcement action 
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against KBR, Inc. (KBR) and alleged that KBR required employees to sign a confidentiality 
statement containing “improperly restrictive language” that could discourage employees from 
reporting potential violations of the federal securities laws to the SEC (SEC 2015). It is important 
to note that the SEC acknowledged that it did not know of any efforts by KBR to enforce these 
confidentiality provisions nor was the Commission aware of any employees who had in fact been 
dissuaded from becoming whistleblowers. KBR settled the SEC’s allegations without admitting or 
denying liability. Thus it is still debatable whether there is any empirical evidence that a standard 
confidentiality agreement discourages employees from blowing the whistle to the SEC. As signing 
a confidentiality agreement is such a popular mechanism to protect sensitive information, future 
research can investigate whether a confidentiality agreement leads to lower whistleblowing 
reporting to the SEC. If this does discourage employees from reporting possible federal securities 
law violations to the SEC, it is worth exploring whether there are any methods that can protect 
corporate sensitive information without discouraging whistleblowing to the SEC.   
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this review is to provide a synthesis of past research in accounting regarding 
determinants of whistleblowing intentions and to identify promising avenues for future research. 
Building upon the whistleblowing model by Near and Miceli (1995), prior literature is summarized 
based on five determinants of effective whistleblowing: characteristics of the whistleblower; 
characteristics of the report recipient, characteristics of the wrongdoer, characteristics of the 
wrongdoing, and characteristics of the organization.  
Overall, there has been extensive research in accounting literature investigating ways to 
encourage whistleblowing. Building upon the model of effective whistleblowing by Near and 
Miceli (1995), this review should help identify directions for future research to extend our 
understanding of the determinants effective whistleblowing. 
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Part Two: A Content Analysis of Organizations’ Internal Whistleblowing Policies 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A series of accounting scandals that began with Enron’s collapse in 2001 has brought 
unprecedented attention to the importance of deterring fraud. Prior researchers document that one 
of the most common method of detecting fraud is employee tips (ACFE 2014; Dyck et al. 2010). 
Corporations prefer employees to report unethical behavior internally, as external reporting brings 
reputation damage and high litigation risk (Barnett et al., 1993; Vandekerckhove and Commers, 
2004; Van Es and Smit, 2003). Many organizations in both the public and private sectors have 
formal whistleblowing policies/procedures (Vandekerckhove and Lewis 2012). These policies 
guide employees through the ethical decision making process. Numerous firms spend an enormous 
amount of funds on the implementation of these policies, such as code of ethics trainings and 
courses (Robertson and Fadil 1998). 
 Emphasizing the importance of written standards to promote internal reporting of ethical 
standard violators, Section 406 of SOX requires public companies to disclose whether they have 
adopted a code of ethics that includes written standards of procedures to promote reporting 
unethical conduct (SEC 2003). The SEC does not provide specific guidance as to how the code of 
ethics should be addressed, what procedures the company should develop, and the types of 
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sanctions that the company should impose. Thus, little is known about the current administrative 
status of codes of ethics for U.S. firms.  
This study performs a content analysis of U.S. listed companies’ internal whistleblowing 
policy section in the code of ethics. Content analysis is “a systematic, replicable technique for 
compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding” 
(Steve 2001, 17). This study focuses on both the content and the linguistic characteristics of the 
policy. Content characteristics refer to what information is included in the policy. Linguistic 
characteristics refer to the language used in the policy.  
This study offers several contributions. First, the results provide useful insights to 
companies and regulators. Prior content analysis on corporate whistleblowing procedures and 
codes of ethics primarily focus on firms listed in European countries. The regulatory environment 
is different for U.S. firms than for international firms. This study examines the corporate 
whistleblowing procedures of firms that are listed on the U.S. stock market. As discussed earlier, 
although Section 406 of SOX requires public companies to disclose whether they have formal 
standards to promote reporting of unethical behaviors, it does not provide specific guidelines in 
terms of the administration of the policy. This study provides insight into companies’ 
implementation and administration of Section 406 of SOX requirements.  
Second, effective communication is considered one of the key components to a code of 
ethics’ success (Stevens 2008), and language plays a critical role in effective communication. This 
study explores the words and language styles used in companies’ whistleblowing policies. It helps 
to identify trends and patterns within whistleblowing policies. As such, this study answers calls 
for further investigation of the design and the implementation of effective internal whistleblowing 
policies/procedures (Vandekerckhove and Lewis 2012). 
 28 
 
Third, through computerized content analysis, many variables that used to be difficult to 
measure can now be generated for future empirical studies. For example, a computerized content 
analysis of internal whistleblowing policies can measure linguistic variables, such as the voice 
(active versus passive), usage of proper nouns, and emotional tone. These variables are difficult to 
measure by hand but can be measured properly through computerized algorithms. Thus, this study 
answers calls for research that identifies operational measures of language characteristics in 
corporate codes of ethics (Logsdon and Wood 2005). 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: the next section includes background 
information and the literature review; section III provides the development of the research 
questions. Section IV describes the data selection, methodology, and the codification process. The 
results and summary of the study are displayed in Section V; and Section VI provides conclusion 
of the study, implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research.  
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Internal Whistleblowing Policies  
Accounting literature investigating employees’ whistleblowing intentions focuses on the 
following determinants: characteristics of the whistleblower, characteristics of the report recipient, 
characteristics of the wrongdoer, characteristics of the wrongdoing, and characteristics of the 
organization. Of these, characteristics of the organization are some of the most important 
determinants in encouraging internal whistleblowing. As discussed by Near and Miceli (1995), the 
organization’s structure and climate can influence employees’ resistance to change. Witnesses’ 
whistleblowing intentions are influenced by their perception of organizational support and whether 
the company is willing to change the wrongful acts. Prior research finds that prior organizational 
response, ethical environment, internal reward, and organizational justice can encourage 
whistleblowing (e.g., Seifert et al. 2010; Xu and Ziegenfuss 2008; Brink et al. 2013; Dalton and 
Radtke 2013; Taylor and Curtis 2013;Zhang et al. 2013).  
Although there are a number of studies investigating the effect of characteristics of the 
organization on whistleblowing, one underexplored area of firm characteristics is the company’s 
internal whistleblowing policies. Corporations prefer witnesses to report internally due to the 
potential for negative consequences of external reporting, such as reputation damage and litigation 
risk (Berry 2004; Davidson and Worrell 1988; Laczniak and Murphy 1991). To promote internal 
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whistleblowing, many organizations in both public and private sectors have formal whistleblowing 
policies/procedures (Vandekerckhove and Lewis 2012).  
Limited prior research investigates corporate whistleblowing policies. However, Barnett et 
al. (1993) find that there is a significant increase in the number of internal disclosures and a 
significant decrease in the number of external disclosures after a company implements an internal 
whistleblowing policy. Vandekerckhove and Lewis (2012) identified and compared five internal 
whistleblowing guidelines from the following four categories: issues relating to who, about what, 
and how; issues relating to defining the responsibility to report; will there be retaliations; and issues 
relating to what constitutes the investigation procedure.2 They find that there are contradictions 
and omissions among the five guidelines and most of the guidelines fail to pay enough attention 
to the process of handling concerns. They call for further investigation of corporations’ formal 
internal whistleblowing polices and state that there is an urgent need to understand the design and 
implementation of effective internal whistleblowing policies/procedures. 
Hassink et al. (2007) conducted a content analysis of whistleblowing policies and the 
related codes of ethics of 56 leading European companies. They find that there are significant 
variations in corporate internal whistleblowing procedures. For example, firms have different 
reporting channels. Fifty percent of the sample provided detailed contact information of where to 
report, and 78 percent of the sample mentioned that the whistleblower’s identity will be kept 
anonymous.  
Prior studies investigating the linguistic characteristics of firms’ formal reporting 
procedures focus on the code of ethics. Farrell and Farrell (1998) investigated codes of ethics of 
                                                          
2 The five internal whistleblowing guidelines are: The Council of Europe Resolution 1729; Recommended Principles 
for Whistleblowing Legislation; European Union Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion; International 
Chamber of Commerce’s Guidelines on Whistleblowing; and the British Standards Institute’s Whistleblowing 
Arrangements Code of Practice 2008.  
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five large enterprises in Australia. They used functional linguistics as the instrument of analysis. 
Functional linguistics describes how language works to achieve a particular purpose, taking into 
account of the role of language and the parties involved in the communication (Collerson 1994; 
Eggins 1994). After investigating the number and frequency of relational clauses (e.g. X is Y, X 
must be Y) and passive words, they suggested that the language used in the code of ethics is 
intended to create and maintain a hierarchical relationship between employer and employees.  
Schwartz (2004) conducted a series of interviews with employees, managers, and ethics 
officers from four large Canadian companies regarding the content and language of firms’ codes 
of ethics. One of the important features in this study involves employees’ perceptions of the tone 
of codes of ethics (i.e., negative language such as ‘do not do x’ versus positive or aspirational 
language such as ‘do y’ or ‘try to do y’). The results indicate that employees prefer the use of a 
negative tone in the code of ethics. Interviewees indicated that a negative tone provides clearer 
expectations than a positive tone. In addition, there is a greater chance of misinterpretation by the 
reader when the code is written in positive or open-ended language (e.g., ‘‘not all gifts are 
unacceptable’’) versus when it is worded in negative or specific language (e.g., ‘‘do not accept 
cash gifts’’).  
Logsdon and Wood (2005) explored the linguistic characteristics of corporate codes of 
ethics in six global petroleum companies. They identified words or sentences that can signal the 
company’s orientation, implementation, and accountability to stakeholders and to employees. 
They suggest that employees can recognize the value assigned by the corporation to ethics and the 
company’s attitude towards reporting of wrongdoing through the language the company uses. They 
call for more research on the language used in codes of ethics/policies to develop additional 
operational measures for language characteristics.  
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Erwin (2011) investigated the relation between the quality of the code of conduct and the 
corporate’s ethical performance. The following components were identified to calculate an overall 
grade of the quality of the code of conduct: public availability, tone from the top, non-retaliation 
and reporting, commitment and values, risk topics (e.g., Does the Code address all of the 
appropriate and key risk areas?), comprehension aids (e.g., Does the Code prove any 
comprehension aids such as Q&As or FAQs?), and presentation and style (e.g., the layout, fonts, 
and pictures). Each category had a specific rating determined by a panel of experts from the 
Ethisphere Council, which is a membership group of the Ethisphere Institute that defines and 
measures corporate ethical standards. The sample’s ethical performance was estimated by the 
presence of each company in the lists for sustainability (Dow Jones Sustainability Index), 
corporate citizenship (100 Best Corporate Citizens), ethical practices (World’s Most Ethical 
Companies), and consumer perception (World’s Most Respected Companies). They found that the 
quality of code of conduct is positively associated with a full range of ethical rankings.  
In summary, prior research indicates that internal whistleblowing policies vary in terms of 
the content and language, and that language pattern and style can influence employees’ perceptions 
of the value conveyed by the policy (Logsdon and Wood 2005; Hassink et al. 2007; Bethoux et al. 
2007; George et al. 2014). While acknowledging the importance and impact of prior research, 
more research is needed to fully understand the current state of corporate internal whistleblowing 
policies. Prior empirical studies focus on either the actual content of the internal whistleblowing 
policy or the language of the policy. However, there is little research investigating both the content 
characteristics and linguistic characteristics simultaneously. Thus, little is known about whether 
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certain sections of the reporting policy are more likely to be associated with certain specific 
linguistic characteristics.  
Second, to my knowledge, there has been no study investigating the characteristics of the 
internal whistleblowing policies of firms listed in the U.S. stock market. Prior studies focused on 
international firms such as European companies or Canadian companies (Schwartz 2004, Hassink 
et al. 2007). As the regulatory environment is different for U.S. firms, results from these studies 
may have limited implications for U.S. firms. 
Third, there are very few linguistic variables in corporate internal whistleblowing policies 
that have been identified and operationalized. This may be due in part to the difficulty of coding 
policy content by hand and the amount of subjectivity involved in the coding process. As 
technology advances, there are many computerized tools developed to measure linguistic variables 
based on reliable natural language processing algorithms (e.g., DICTION 5.0, STYLE, 
ATLAS.ti™ , and LIWC). DICTION 5.0 is a dictionary-based content analysis program (Hart 
1984, Hart 2000) that is used extensively to analyze narrative discourse. STYLE is a computer 
program that analyzes the surface characteristics of a document such as sentence length and type, 
word usage, and other readability measures (Cherry and Vesterman 1991). ATLAS.ti™ is a 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software package. It can provide a systematic analysis 
of text-based documents. LIWC is described as:  
A software program that contains a number of dictionaries associated with various 
constructs, such as negative emotions, positive emotions, causation, insight, inclusive, 
exclusive, and so on. The program searches a given text for the words contained in each 
dictionary and outputs the percentage of hits associated with the given dictionary. 
(Donohue et al. 2014, 283).  
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Many of these tools are used to generate linguistic variables in financial accounting research by 
analyzing the linguistic characteristics of annual reports.  
Linguistic Characteristics in Financial Accounting  
Goldberg (1964, 348) claimed “it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the problem of 
communication is the axial problem in accounting.” Language is a critical component of effective 
communication. There is a growing body of research that uses computerized language processing 
tools to investigate the value of linguistic features in financial reporting.  
Davis et al. (2008) used textual-analysis to measure the degree of optimistic and pessimistic 
language in a sample of approximately 24,000 earnings press releases issued between 1998 and 
2003. They used DICTION 5.0 (Hart 2000a, 2001) to analyze narrative discourse, and to obtain 
systematic measures of the levels of optimistic and pessimistic language used in earnings press 
releases by counting the number of optimistic and pessimistic words (Hart 1984, 1987, 2000a, 
2000b, 2001). They found that optimistic or pessimistic language usage is a predictor of future 
firm performance.  
Sadique et al. (2008) investigated the relation between stock market reactions and the tone 
of the public by analyzing the tone of the media news articles and earnings press releases. They 
use DICTION 5.0 to generate a measure of positive and negative tone by calculating the percentage 
of negative words and positive words. Their results indicate that positive tone is associated with 
increases in a firm’s stock returns and decreases in stock volatility. A negative tone is associated 
with decreases in stock returns and increases in stock price volatility.  
Goel et al. (2010) employ natural language processing (NLP) tools and linguistic features 
of annual reports to identify fraudulent annual reports. They create a methodology which employs 
machine-learning techniques to proactively detect fraud by building an automated fraud classifier. 
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The linguistic features were extracted by using DICTION 5.0 and STYLE. They found that 
linguistic features are an important tool that can be used to detect fraud. Their fraud detection 
model’s accuracy rate increased from 56.75 percent to 89.51 percent after incorporating the annual 
reports’ linguistic characteristics.  
Goel and Gangolly (2012) investigated whether there is any systematic difference in terms 
of the language and presentation style used between fraudulent annual reports and non-fraudulent 
annual reports. They used DICTION 5.0, STYLE, and LIWC (Pennebaker et al. 2007) to extract 
linguistic markers. They found that fraudulent financial accounting is associated with the following 
linguistic cues: use of complex sentential structures; low readability; use of positive tone; use of 
passive voice; use of uncertainty markers; and use of adverbs.  
In summary, prior studies employed several computerized tools to measure linguistic 
features in financial documents. Linguistic features, such as pronouns and language tone, play an 
important role in predicting firm performance and fraudulent reporting. As discussed in the 
previous section, there are calls for further research to investigate the characteristics of corporate 
internal reporting policies by incorporating analyses of content and linguistic features. This study 
takes an exploratory approach to investigate internal whistleblowing policies through a 
computerized content analysis. Specifically, this study analyzes the characteristics of 
organizations’ internal whistleblowing policies’ content and language. By incorporating 
computerized language processing tools to analyze the linguistic features of internal 
whistleblowing policies, this study measures many linguistic features that have not been identified 
in previous whistleblowing policy content analyses. 
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III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
The Content Characteristics of Internal Whistleblowing Policy  
Consistent with Vandekerckhove and Lewis (2012), this study focuses on the following 
components in defining whistleblowing policy content. The first component is “general content, 
scope, and tone.” This includes the executives’ opening letter, the description of the importance of 
the policy, and any comprehension aids. The second component is “who, what, and where.” This 
includes who is covered by the policy, what is the responsibility of the employee, and where to 
report. The third component is “Investigation procedures, wrongdoer disciplinary action, and anti-
retaliation policy.” It defines the investigation procedures, the disciplinary actions against 
wrongdoers, and the anti-retaliation policy. In summary, the first research question is:  
RQ1: What are the content characteristics of companies’ internal whistleblowing 
policies? 
       
The Linguistic Characteristics of Internal Whistleblowing Policy  
In terms of the linguistic characteristics of the internal whistleblowing policy, this study 
focuses on the following characteristics: the types of pronouns, the uncertainty language, and the 
linguistic tones. First, the types of pronouns in the policy. This includes: first person pronouns (I, 
me, mine, and my), second person pronouns (you, your, and yours), and third person pronouns (he, 
she, him, her, his, and hers). Companies vary the use of pronouns in narrative disclosures (Goel et 
 37 
 
al. 2010). For example, Walmart describes part of its whistleblowing policy in first person 
pronouns:  
Q: My manager told me to markdown several items to zero but leave them on the 
shelves to sell because it will “help our inventory.” Is this acceptable? A: No. The 
manipulation of markdowns is not only dishonest, but it also could affect the store’s 
profitability. If you’re being instructed to do this, report it to Global Ethics immediately. 
(Walmart 2016, 23).  
On the other hand, American Express’s whistleblowing policy uses third person pronouns:  
Q: Katerina’s leader tells her to delay sending an invoice to Vendors Payable until next 
quarter. Katerina assumes her leader is trying to give their department some leeway to meet 
next quarter’s quota. Should she follow her leader’s request? A: No. All goods and services 
must be accounted for in the period incurred. Because Katerina’s leader is asking her to 
create an inaccurate record, she should report the situation immediately to her business 
unit’s Controller or Compliance Officer. (American Express 2016, 18).  
As exemplified in the above two examples, the language used in organizations’ 
whistleblowing policies varies in the type of pronouns used. One thing to note is that in the 
American Express example, the third person is a fictitious person named “Katerina” rather than 
just a generic third person, such as “an employee”. Thus, this study separates third person pronouns 
into two sub categories: a generic third person and a fictitious third person.  
The second linguistic feature is the level of uncertainty conveyed by language in the 
whistleblowing policy. Many studies use uncertainty markers to study style, expression, affect, 
and attitude in text (Lackoff 1973; Glover and Hirst 1996; Uzuner and Katz 2005; Rubin et al. 
2006). If more uncertainty words are used in a whistleblowing policy, the employee may believe 
that management is not taking whistleblowing seriously, and they may feel uncertain about their 
responsibility to report a wrongdoing. 
Finally, the third linguistic feature is the tone of the whistleblowing policy. The tone will 
be analyzed by classifying the text as positive or negative (Goel et al. 2010; Abrahamson and Amir 
1996; Smith and Taffler 2000; Henry 2006). Prior studies show that negative words may trigger 
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stronger emotional reactions than similar positive words (Brink and Rankin 2013). Further, People 
may weigh a negative voice more heavily than a positive voice (Maxham and Netemeyer 2003; 
Mahajan et al. 1984). Negative words in an internal whistleblowing policy may trigger more 
attention from the employee than positive words, and the employee may have stronger emotional 
reactions to negative words than to positive words.  
In summary, the second research question is summarized as:  
RQ2: What are the linguistic characteristics of companies’ internal whistleblowing 
policies? 
 
The Relation between Content Characteristics and Linguistic Characteristics 
The last part of the content analysis will focus on the relations among the various content 
and linguistic characteristics identified above. By investigating the content characteristics and 
linguistic characteristics at the same time, this study can identify the frequency of overlaps between 
the content and the language characteristics. This process can help answer questions such as: What 
is the tone normally used when describing employees’ responsibility to report wrongdoing? Do 
the types of pronouns vary between sections of the whistleblowing policy? Thus, the third research 
question is summarized as follows:  
RQ3: Do companies prefer to describe certain information content using certain 
linguistic features in their internal whistleblowing policies? 
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IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Sample Selection 
A sample of 50 companies’ internal whistleblowing policies was collected for analysis. 
The companies selected are the 50 largest U.S. companies by stock market capitalization as of 
March 31, 2016. Prior research adopts a similar sample selection approach. For example, Hassink 
et al. (2007) conducted a content analysis of whistleblowing policies of European companies. The 
sample in their study is the Ftse Eurotop-100, which features the largest European listed 
companies.  
The internal whistleblowing policies were extracted from the companies’ code of ethics. 
Under section 406 of SOX, public companies should provide the code of ethics and make it 
publicly available. Companies without a code of ethics must explain the reasons in their annual 
reports. Under the SEC’s definition, the code of ethics should include written standards and 
procedures for the promotion of reporting unethical or illegal behaviors. Starting in 2003, public 
companies listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq Stock Market (NASDAQ) 
are required to have code of business ethics and make it publicly available (NYSE 2009; NASDAQ 
2016). Thus, public companies internal whistleblowing policies can be found from their code of 
ethics, which are publicly available on their websites.  
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Methodology 
This study was conducted through a qualitative research method. Qualitative research is an 
exploratory approach. In qualitative research, hypotheses are not tested, and meanings and themes 
can emerge from data gathered through observations (Corbin and Strauss 1990). A qualitative 
content analysis is “a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into 
fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding” (Steve 2001, 17).  
The qualitative data analysis software for this study is ATLAS.ti™. As mentioned earlier, 
Atlas ti is a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software package. It can provide a 
systematic analysis of text-based documents. Although this software has not been widely used in 
accounting research, it is a well-recognized qualitative data analysis software (QDAS). As 
reviewed by Woods et al. (2015), there is an increasing number researchers using ATLAS.ti™. 
Specifically, they document 349 studies using ATLAS.ti™ between 1994 and 2013. It is one of 
the two longest used QDAS tools (Muhr 1991; Richards and Richards 1991).  
The Codification Process 
As discussed earlier, the content analysis focuses on three areas of companies’ internal 
whistleblowing policies: the content characteristics of the internal whistleblowing policy; the 
linguistic characteristics of the policy, and the relation between the content characteristics and the 
linguistic characteristics of the policy.  
Coding of the Content Characteristics 
The content characteristics of companies’ internal whistleblowing policies are coded in the 
software by hand. The researchers read through all the fifty whistleblowing policies in the software 
and classify the content of the policies into different content characteristics codes following the 
coding index displayed in Table 2.1.  
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[Insert Table 2.1 Here] 
Coding of the Linguistic Characteristics 
This study investigates three linguistic characteristics: types of pronouns, language 
uncertainty, and linguistic tone. Coding the types of pronouns was conducted via the “auto-coding” 
feature in ATLAS.ti™ first, and then the generic third person and the fictitious third person 
pronouns were separated by hand. The other two linguistic characteristics were coded through the 
“auto-coding” feature in ATLAS.ti™. The “auto-coding” feature is a process of automatically 
searching for frequency counts of words based on a defined word list throughout the document 
and coding findings in the software. 
The list of uncertainty words used in this study was taken from Loughran-McDonald 
dictionaries of uncertainty words (Loughran and McDonald 2011, Bodnaruk et al. 2015). The list 
of words indicating linguistic tones was derived based on prior studies by Abrahamson and Amir 
(1996), Smith and Taffler (2000), and Henry (2006). The words list for each of the three linguistic 
characteristics is included in the Appendix B. Through auto-coding, the frequency counts of these 
words exist in the whistleblowing policy can be identified and coded. The three linguistic variables 
and words list are listed below.  
1.  The types of pronouns 
First person, Second person, Generic third person, 
Fictitious third person (See Appendix B) 
2.  The scale of uncertainty language See Appendix B 
3.  The linguistic tone See Appendix B 
 
Through the “co-occurrence” tool in ATLAS.ti™, the overlapping occurrence of different 
characteristics can be identified. The “co-occurrence” tool provides a cross-tabulation of codes 
and the number within each cell is a frequency count of how often each pair of codes co-occurs. 
This process helps identify the frequency with which one code co-occurs with another code.  
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V. RESULTS 
 
Coding Reliability  
As discussed earlier, the linguistic characteristics are coded automatically by using the 
ATLAS.ti™ software and the content characteristics are coded by hand. To measure the reliability 
of the coding process, there is a second coder to manually code the linguistic characteristics and 
the content characteristics. The intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC) between the coders are 
0.75 for the content characteristics and 0.89 for the linguistic characteristics. Prior studies 
suggested that values from 0.75 to 1.00 for continuous scales is considered good to excellent inter-
rater reliability (Fleiss 1987; Streiner and Norman 1995; and Cicchetti 1994). Thus, the coding 
process in this study has good inter-rater reliability.3  
The Content Characteristics of Internal Whistleblowing Policy  
Table 2.2 summarizes the percentage of each content characteristic’ existence out of 50 
firms. Panel A of Table 2.2 reports the contents of general content, scope, and tone. It summarizes 
the percentage of the sample that have executive opening letters (39 of 50, 78%), the existence of 
executive’s photo in the letter (29 of 50, 58%), specific requirement of employees to read and 
understand the policy (39 of 50, 78%), policy compliance affirmation with periodic certification 
                                                          
3 To manually code the linguistic characteristics and content characteristics for all the 50 firms is not practical, 
because it would involve manually identify thousands of codes. Thus, the authors randomly picked several firms for 
the second coder. The second coder only manually coded the linguistic characteristics for five firms and coded the 
content characteristics for three firms. I believe that if the inter-rater reliability is good for the randomly selected 
firms, it would suggest good coding reliability for the 50 firms.  
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(16 of 50, 32%), content related to policy training (30 of 50, 60%), and content specifically state 
that employee compliance with the policy is a condition of employment (4 of 50, 8%). Firms use 
several methods to help employees to interpret the policy, including Q/A, Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQ), case scenario, and decision assistance tools. Companies provide decision trees 
or decision flow charts to help employees make better decisions. This study classified these 
features as decision assistance tools. Results show that 64% of the sample has a Q/A section (32 
of 50), 62% have decision assistance tools (31 of 50), and only 10% have case scenarios to help 
interpret the policy (5 of 50).  
Panel B of Table 2.2 reports the content related to who is covered by the policy, what is 
the responsibility, and where to report. In terms of who is covered by the policy, the results show 
that all of the 50 firms specifically mention that corporate employees are covered by the policy, 
62% of the policies state that board of directors are also covered by the policy (31 of 50), 42% of 
the sample requires that the entire group needs to follow the policy (21 of 50), 28% state that their 
policies also apply to business partners (14 of 50), and 36% state their policies apply to temporary 
workers or contract workers (18 of 50). Only 8% of the sample specifically mentions that 
executives are also covered by the policy (4 of 50).  
In regard to defining employees’ responsibility to report, 86% of the sample requires 
employees to ask questions when they are not sure what to do (43 of 50), 98% of the sample 
requires employees to report concerns (49 of 50), 16% of the sample states that employees should 
report concerns even if no problem is found (8 of 50), and 50% of the sample requires employees 
to report concerns in good faith (25 of 50). When it comes to mangers’ responsibility in handling 
wrongdoing reports, 56% of the sample requires managers to create a reporting environment (28 
of 50), 48% requires managers to lead by example (24 of 50), 46% mentions that managers should 
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respond to ethical reporting (23 of 50), and only 4% state that maintaining the non-retaliation 
policy is also the mangers’ responsibility (2 of 50).  
In terms of where to report wrongdoing, the most common channel is reporting to 
supervisors (48 of 50, 96%). Out of the 50 firms, 22% of the firms explicitly state that employees 
should report to their supervisor first (11 of 50), 66% of the sample implicitly require supervisor 
reporting by listing supervisors ahead of other reporting channels (33 of 50), 80% have Human 
Resources (HR) as a reporting channel, 72% have the legal division as a reporting channel, 82% 
mention that employees can report to the compliance/ethics office, 6% mention the external auditor 
as a reporting channel, and only 4% mention that employees can report to their co-worker. 
Furthermore, 84% of the sample mention that there are anonymous reporting channels available.  
Panel B of Table 2.2 also reports the reporting media frequencies among the 50 firms. Of 
the different types of reporting media, 82% of the sample mentions reporting concerns can be done 
via phone, 48% mention some type of online reporting portal, following which are email with 44%, 
traditional postal mail with 36%, and fax with 16%. Only 2% mention that employees can report 
by sending a text message.  
Panel C of Table 2.2 reports the content related to investigation procedures, wrongdoer 
disciplinary action, and anti-retaliation policy. In terms of the investigation procedures, 66% of 
the sample has content mentioning the companies’ investigation procedures (33 of 50), 62% state 
that witnesses should cooperate with investigations (31 of 50), 22% state that witnesses should not 
provide misleading information during the investigation (11 of 50), and 12% state that there will 
be punishment if witnesses provide misleading information (6 of 50). Only 12% of the sample 
mentions that there will be corrective actions after investigation (6 of 50), 18% provide information 
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related to an external investigation from government (9 of 50), and 52% of the sample states that 
the company will maintain witnesses’ confidentiality during the investigation (26 of 50).  
As to the content related to wrongdoers, 26% of the sample states that wrongdoers include 
those who detect unethical behaviors but fail to report (13 of 50), 8% mention that wrongdoing 
includes a manger’s failure to detect unethical behaviors (4 of 50), and 20% state that wrongdoing 
includes mangers’ ignorance (10 of 50). Most of the sample provides some general statement 
relating to punishment of wrongdoers (45 of 50, 90%). In terms of the types of punishment, 84% 
specifically state that wrongdoers will be punished by termination of job (42 of 50), 34% mention 
some sort of legal punishment (17 of 50), and only 8% mention monetary punishment (4 of 50).  
Another important section of the reporting policy is the anti-retaliation policy. Of the 
sample, 96% has some general statement stating that no retaliation is allowed (48 of 50), 82% 
require good faith reporting as a condition of a no retaliation policy (41 of 50), 18% have a detailed 
definition of what constitutes good faith (9 of 50), 8% state that the company will investigate the 
incident if there is retaliation against witnesses (4 of 50), 20% of the sample has a list of retaliation 
examples (10 of 50), 36% mention that there will be punishment against retaliation behaviors (18 
of 50), 30% specifically mention that retaliation will be punished by termination (15 of 50), and 
only 8% mention that retaliation will be punished by legal action (4 of 50).  
[Insert Table 2.2 Here] 
Table 2.3 reports the number of words occurring in each content characteristic. As reported 
in Panel A of Table 2.3, the executive letter accounts for 9.8% of the policy content, the importance 
of the policy accounts for 4%, and comprehension aid takes 28.8% of the policy content. Of the 
total words, 3.4% describe who is covered by the policy, 12.8% describe the responsibility of the 
employee to report wrongdoing, 21.7% describe where to report, and 4.4% of the words are used 
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in describing the reporting media format. Investigation procedures take about 5.2% of the words, 
wrongdoer disciplinary action takes about 3.4%, and the anti-retaliation policy takes about 6.4%.  
Panel B of Table 2.3 provides details of the percentage within each of the content categories. 
Within the importance of the policy category, 35.5% of the words are used to describe that 
employees should read and understand the policy, and 35.6% of the words are used to discuss the 
policy training information. Within the comprehensive aid category, Q/A accounts for 84% of the 
words, with Questions accounting for 30.1%, and Answers accounting for 53.9% of the words. 
Within who is covered by the policy, 32.3% of the words describe employees, 22.6% describe the 
board of directors, 16.8% describe the entire group, and 16.1% describe business partners. In terms 
of the content describing responsibilities, words used for the employees’ responsibility account for 
77.1%, and the words used for mangers responsibility account for 22.9%. Within employees’ 
responsibilities, most of the words are used in discussing the responsibility of asking questions 
(18.2%) and the responsibility of reporting concerns (49.7%). As to where to report, most of the 
words are used in describing the hotlines (25%), following that are compliance/ethics office 
(16.5%), supervisors (15.6%) and legal division (9.9%). The four most discussed reporting media 
formats are phone (34.4%), website (21.6%), mail (19.9%), and email (15.8%).  
In terms of investigative procedures, the word usage focuses on discussing the general 
investigation procedures (32.1%), confidentiality and anonymity (25%), witness cooperation 
(16.9%), and external investigation (13.1%). As to the content related to wrongdoers, the mention 
of disciplinary action accounts for 36.6% of the words, termination of jobs accounts for 31.8%, 
and legal punishment accounts for 14.5%. As for the anti-retaliation policy content, 46.6% of the 
words are used in the general statement of no retaliation allowed, and 26.6% of the words are 
related to reporting with good faith.  
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[Insert Table 2.3 Here] 
 The Linguistic Characteristics of Internal Whistleblowing Policy  
Table 2.4 presents the usage of different types of linguistic characteristics in companies’ 
whistleblowing policies. As shown in Panel A, pronouns account for 4.8% of all the words in the 
policy, uncertainty words account for 0.7%, and linguistic tone accounts for 1.6%. Panel B 
provides the detailed linguistic features within pronouns and linguistic tone. As to pronouns, 46.8% 
of the pronouns are first-person pronouns, 42.7% are second-person pronouns, and 10.5% are 
third-person pronouns. Within the first-person pronouns, 29.1% are in singular format, and 17.8% 
are in plural format. Within the third-person pronouns, 3.4% are in singular format, and 7.1% are 
in plural format. In addition, 84.1% of the linguistic tone is positive tone, while 15.9% is negative 
tone.  
[Insert Table 2.4 Here] 
The Overlap within Content Characteristics 
 Table 2.5 presents the C-Coefficient between “executives’ opening letter” and the rest of 
the content characteristics. This helps describe what executives discuss in their opening letters. 
The c-coefficient varies between 0 (codes do not co-occur) and 1 (two codes always occur 
together). It shows that “executives’ opening letter” has a 0.41 C-Coefficient with “importance of 
the policy”, a 0.41 C-Coefficient with “what is the responsibility”, a 0.39 C-Coefficient with 
“Where to report”, a 0.14 C-Coefficient with “Anti-retaliation policy”, and a 0.13 C-Coefficient 
with “Who is covered by the policy”. Executives opening letters have limited overlap with 
“Comprehension aid”, “investigation procedures” and “wrongdoer disciplinary action”. This 
suggests that companies use executives’ opening letters mostly to emphasize the importance of the 
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policy, the responsibilities, and where to report. The opening letters have limited discussions of 
investigative procedures and disciplinary actions against wrongdoers.  
[Insert Table 2.5 Here] 
Table 2.6 summarizes the C-Coefficient between “Q/A” and the rest of the content 
characteristics. The C-Coefficient between “Q/A” and “what is the responsibility” is 0.39, and the 
C-Coefficient between “Q/A” and “who is covered by the policy” is 0.13. Additionally, C-
Coefficient between “Q/A” and “Where to report” is 0.39. There is limited overlap between “Q/A” 
and other content characteristics.  
[Insert Table 2.6 Here] 
The Overlap between Content Characteristics and Linguistic Characteristics 
Table 2.7 lists the overlap between content characteristics and linguistic characteristics. 
Panel A and Figure 2.1 list the overlap between types of pronouns and content characteristics. It 
suggests that there is great variation in terms of the percentage of different types of pronouns used 
in different content areas. Companies seem to use more first-person pronouns when describing the 
executive letter, importance of the policy, comprehension aid, and who is covered by the policy. 
Companies start to use more second-person pronouns and less first-person pronouns when they 
start to describe the responsibility, where to report, and what constitutes the report media. Third 
person pronoun usage is relatively consistent across different content.  
Panel B and Figure 2.2 list the overlap between different content and uncertainty words 
and linguistic tone. It indicates that when companies are describing the wrongdoer’s disciplinary 
actions, the usage of uncertainty words is the highest. For most of the content, the company uses 
more positive tone than negative tone. As firms start to discuss the wrongdoers’ disciplinary 
actions, there is an increase in the negative tone and a decrease in the positive tone.  
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[Insert Table 2.7 Here] 
[Insert Figure 2.1 Here] 
[Insert Figure 2.2 Here] 
Table 2.8 summarizes the usage of fictitious third person pronouns and generic third person 
pronouns in Q/A sections. It suggests that most of the third person pronouns used in companies’ 
Q/A are in fictitious third person pronouns (86%), and only 14% of the total third person pronoun 
Q/A are in generic third person pronouns.  
[Insert Table 2.8 Here] 
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VI: SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
This study takes an exploratory approach to investigate the content and linguistic 
characteristics of companies’ internal reporting policies with a sample of 50 firms. Results indicate 
that most firms specifically mention that employees need to read and understand the policy (78%), 
and some firms also state that employees need to periodically certify their compliance with the 
policy (32%). More than half of the firms have information related to policy training (30 of 50, 
60%). Thus, the internal reporting policy is important to employees in terms of guiding them to 
make the correct ethical decisions.  
In terms of where to report, first of all, firms prefer employees to report their supervisors.  
Results show that 66% of the firms implicitly mention that employees are encouraged to report to 
their supervisors first, and the most common reporting channel is reporting to supervisors (48 of 
50, 96%). In regards to the reporting media, phone is the most common media used to report 
wrongdoing (41 of 50, 82%). As internet technology advances, reporting unethical behavior using 
the internet is also very common. Results indicate that 48% of the sample has an online reporting 
website, and 44% of the sample mentions that employees can report via Email.  
Throughout companies’ internal reporting policies, most of the words are used to describe 
the following content categories: where to report wrongdoing (21%) and employees’ 
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responsibilities (12.8%).  Companies use relatively less words in describing the investigation 
procedures (5.2%) and anti-retaliation policies (6.4%). This result is interesting because prior 
research documents that the primary reason why people do not want to report misconduct is the 
fear of reprisal (Wainberg and Perreault 2016). Providing such limited information on investigative 
procedures and anti-retaliation policies may increase employees’ fear of reprisal.       
Within companies’ internal reporting policies, all firms in the sample state that the internal 
reporting policy applies to all employees, and only 8% of the sample specifically mention that 
executives are also covered by the policy. This small percentage is worth noting because many 
wrongful acts are committed by executive level employees. To promote ethical conduct and 
encourage witnesses’ reporting of unethical behaviors, it is important that employees feel that 
executives are treated the same as everyone else in the company when it comes to unethical 
behaviors.  
In regard to the content related to everyone’s responsibility, most of the words are used to 
describe employees’ responsibilities (77%), and a relatively small amount of words are used to 
discuss managers’ responsibilities (23%). Several studies document that tone at the top is a crucial 
determinant of ethical practices within organizations (e.g., Bannon et al. 2010; Berson et al. 2008; 
Merchant 1990; Schaubroeck et al. 2012; Weber 2010). Limited discussion of managers’ 
responsibilities in companies’ internal reporting policies may influence employees’ perception of 
the tone at the top.  
The executive’s opening letter is the first thing employees read in the policy, and 78% (39 
of 50) of the firms have an executive’s opening letter. Results show that most of the information 
discussed in the letter relates to the importance of the policy, the employees’ responsibilities in 
regard to reporting, and where to report. Opening letters have limited discussion of investigative 
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procedures and disciplinary actions against wrongdoers. This is noteworthy as providing more 
detailed discussion on the investigative procedures and disciplinary actions against wrongdoers in 
the executive’s opening letter section may indicate that the company takes unethical conduct 
seriously.  
There is great variation in terms of the percentage of different types of pronouns used in 
different content. Overall, companies seem to use more first-person pronouns than second-person 
pronouns. Companies start to use more second-person pronouns and less first-person pronouns 
when they start to describe the employees’ responsibility, where to report, and the reporting media. 
Third person pronoun usage is relatively consistent across different content. Overall, the greater 
usage of second-person pronouns in describing employees’ reporting responsibility, where to 
report, and the reporting media may indicate that the policy is designed to give direct instructions 
about what employees should do in these sections.    
This study also suggests that the usage of uncertainty words seems to be the highest when 
companies are describing the wrongdoer’s disciplinary actions. This could potentially make 
employees doubt the seriousness of the company’s attitude towards unethical behaviors, because 
employees may be uncertain about whether wrongdoers will actually be punished or not.  
Throughout the policy, there is more positive linguistic tone usage than negative linguistic 
tone usage. However, as firms start to discuss the disciplinary actions against wrongdoers, there is 
an increase in negative tone and a decrease in positive tone. It is intuitive as more negative words 
may be used when the company is talking about the punishments for wrongdoers.  
In summary, this exploratory content analysis identifies many interesting patterns of 
companies’ internal whistleblowing policy. However, a limitation of this study, and all qualitative 
studies, is that results in this study are not tested empirically. Notwithstanding the limitation, this 
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study documents several trends that future studies could investigate. First, companies use a lot of 
words in the Q/A section. Also, there are variations in the usage of pronouns across reporting 
policies. Experimental research could investigate whether different types of pronouns used in the 
Q/A section might influence employees’ reporting intentions.  
Second, the content and linguistic characteristics identified in this study could also 
potentially provide an index to measure the quality of companies’ internal reporting policies. By 
taking an archival approach, it would be instructive to investigate whether there are any 
correlations between the quality of companies’ internal reporting policies and the quality of their 
financial statements.  
Third, one additional limitation of this study is that it only explores the content of the 
policies of the 50 largest U.S. companies by stock market capitalization as of March 31, 2016. It 
is possible the variation in content may be limited by only selecting the top 50 firms. Future 
research could extend this study by investigating the bottom 50 firms, and compare whether there 
are systematic content and linguistic differences between the top 50 firms and the bottom 50 firms.  
Fourth, this study only investigates three linguistic features: pronouns, uncertainty words, 
and linguistic tone. Other linguistic features (e.g., readability, passive or active voice) may also 
provide valuable insights for internal reporting policy effectiveness. Senay et al. (2015) 
documented that passive voice, as compared with active voice, may shift people’s attention away 
from themselves and to the task they are assigned to (e.g., ‘It will be done’ vs. ‘I will do it’). Thus, 
an effective internal reporting policy may involve strategically designing the use of passive voice 
and active voice. Future research could investigate such linguistic variables to explore firms’ 
internal reporting policies.  
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Finally, it is likely that different industries may have unique content or linguistic features 
in their internal reporting policies. Additionally, the content and linguistic characteristics may have 
changed over time, perhaps before or after significant events (e.g., SOX). It would be interesting 
to explore the content and linguistic features of the internal reporting policy across different 
industries and over time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part Three: Using Pronouns Effectively in an Organization’s Internal Whistleblowing Policy 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Public companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq Stock 
Market (NASDAQ) must have a publicly available code of business ethics (NYSE 2009; 
NASDAQ 2016). Companies’ codes of ethics should include procedures to promote internal 
reporting of unethical behaviors (SEC 2003). A survey conducted by KPMG finds that 85 percent 
of employees in the United States receive some form of communication and training specific to 
their companies’ code of conduct, and around 86 percent of these communications are formal 
training (KPMG 2013). Although codes of ethics are widely used by public firms to communicate 
ethical issues with employees, there is no conclusive evidence of the effectiveness of codes of 
ethics in encouraging desired employee behaviors (Kaptein and Schwartz 2008).  
One of the key issues for a code of ethics’ success is effective communication (Stevens 
2008). Language is a key componenet of effective communication. Employees can recognize the 
value assigned by the corporation to ethical issues through the language the company uses 
(Bethoux et al. 2007; Logsdon and Wood 2005). The current study examines one common, yet 
underexplored, factor: the use of pronouns in corporate internal whistleblowing polices. Different 
types of pronouns reflect different emotional states, personality, and other features of social 
relationships (Chung and Pennebaker 2007; Pennebaker et al. 2007). First person pronouns 
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include: I, me, mine, and my. Second person pronouns include: you, your, and yours. Third person 
pronouns include: he, she, him, her, his, and hers.  This study investigates how the use and 
placement of first or third-person pronouns in the whistleblowing policy within a company’s code 
of ethics affects employees’ whistleblowing intentions.  
This study breaks the internal whistleblowing policy into two parts: the Reporting Policy 
(the description of employees’ responsibility to report and where to report) and the Anti-retaliation 
Policy (the description of protections against retaliation). It employs a 2 x 2 between-subjects 
design by manipulating the type of pronouns used in the Reporting Policy (first-person pronoun 
reporting policy or third-person pronoun reporting policy) and the type of pronouns used in the 
Anti-retaliation Policy (first-person pronoun anti-retaliation policy or third-person pronoun anti-
retaliation policy). This study predicts that the effectiveness of first-person pronouns in 
encouraging whistleblowing is contingent upon policy content. Results show that using first-
person pronouns encourages whistleblowing when they are used in the Reporting Policy. However, 
the type of pronouns used in the Anti-retaliation Policy has no significant influence on employees’ 
reporting intentions. Additionally, employees’ perceptions of the vividness of the policy fully 
mediates the first-person Reporting Policy’s effect on employees’ reporting intentions. In other 
words, the first-person pronoun is effective in influencing reporting behavior because it can change 
the vividness of the Reporting Policy’s message.  Employees’ perceptions of the vividness of the 
policy include: how precise the policy is, how clear the policy is, how specific the policy is, and 
do they feel the policy is applicable to them. 
This study offers several contributions to the literature. First, this is the first study 
investigating the effects of pronoun usage in firms’ internal whistleblowing policies on employees’ 
whistleblowing intentions. Thus, it extends the accounting literature by incorporating relevant 
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findings from the linguistic literature to improve our understanding of how companies can 
communicate more effectively with employees. Second, the results have implications for 
companies who have internal whistleblowing procedures intended to encourage internal reporting. 
Our results indicate that the language used in these whistleblowing policies, specifically the use of 
pronouns, may interact with policy content to influence employees’ reporting intentions. This 
study provides evidence that can assist companies in identifying the whistleblowing policy 
language that is most effective in encouraging internal reporting. Third, the results of this study 
imply that even if companies have the same reporting procedures and policy content, variation in 
the type of language used can lead to differences in employees’ reporting intentions. This 
highlights a potential issue in existing regulation that ignores the specific presentation of 
information. For example, Section 406 of SOX requires public companies to disclose whether they 
have adopted a corporate code of business ethics that should include procedures for reporting 
ethical violations. However, the SEC does not provide specific guidance as to how such procedures 
should be presented.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section includes background 
information, theory, and hypotheses development. Section III provides the methodology, 
participants, design, experimental task, independent variables, and dependent variables. Section 
IV provides the results and Section V provides a summary of the study, implications, limitations, 
and suggestions for future research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Internal Whistleblowing Policies and Corporate Codes of Ethics 
Starting with the collapse of Enron in 2001, a series of accounting scandals significantly 
hurt investors’ confidence in stock market. To restore investors’ confidence in the wake of a 
number of well-publicized U.S. public company failures, a series of regulations was implemented. 
Among them, Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires public companies to 
disclose the existence of a code of ethics that provides guidance to employees when facing ethical 
issues (SEC 2003). Following SOX, NYSE and NASDAQ began to require companies listed on 
their exchanges to adopt a code of business conduct for all employees, make the code publicly 
available, and disclose it in their annual report (NYSE 2009; NASDAQ 2016). By definition, the 
code of ethics should include written standards to promote honest and ethical conduct and provide 
channels for employees to report wrongdoing to an appropriate person or persons (SEC 2003). In 
other words, public firms’ codes of ethics should include a description of whistleblowing 
procedures. 
Firms expend much effort in an attempt to communicate their codes of ethics with 
employees. A survey conducted by KPMG finds that 85 percent of employees in United States 
receive some form of communication and training on their companies’ code of conduct, and around 
86 percent of these communications are related to formal training (KPMG 2013). Many firms 
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specifically state in their code of ethics that reading and learning the code of ethics is the first thing 
new employees need to do. For example, American Express’ code of ethics specifically states that 
employees need to confirm in writing or electronically that they have read and understand the 
company’s code of ethics (American Express 2016). Although companies are increasingly paying 
attention to the promotion of codes of ethics, the effectiveness of these codes in promoting desired 
behaviors is not conclusive (Kaptein and Schwartz 2008). Vandekerckhove and Lewis (2012) 
document an urgent need to better understand the design and implementation of effective internal 
whistleblowing policies/procedures. Stevens (2008) argues that one of the key issues in the success 
of codes of ethics is effective communication. 
Use of Pronouns in Internal Whistleblowing Policies  
One common practice in companies’ internal whistleblowing policies is the use of 
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) or Question and Answer (Q/A) formatting. These formats are 
used as comprehension aids in explaining key features of the policy (Erwin 2011). With these 
formats, companies list selected specific questions that employees may have when facing unethical 
conduct and provide answers for these questions. The use of pronouns in companies’ 
whistleblowing FAQ or Q/A sections varies. Some firms describe their whistleblowing policy 
using first or second person pronouns (e.g., we, you, ours, or yours). For example, the following 
information is an excerpt from Walmart’s whistleblowing policy, which uses first and second 
person pronouns (emphasis added): 
Q: My manager told me to markdown several items to zero but leave them on the 
shelves to sell because it will “help our inventory.” Is this acceptable?  
A: No. The manipulation of markdowns is not only dishonest, but it also could affect the 
store’s profitability. If you’re being instructed to do this, report it to Global Ethics 
immediately. (Walmart 2016, 23). 
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Other companies use third-person pronouns (e.g., him, she, it, his, her or they) to describe 
their whistleblowing policies. For instance, the following is an excerpt from American Express’s 
whistleblowing policy, which uses third-person pronouns (emphasis added):  
 Q: Katerina’s leader tells her to delay sending an invoice to Vendors Payable until next 
quarter. Katerina assumes her leader is trying to give their department some leeway to 
meet next quarter’s quota. Should she follow her leader’s request?  
A: No. All goods and services must be accounted for in the period incurred. Because 
Katerina’s leader is asking her to create an inaccurate record, she should report the 
situation immediately to her business unit’s Controller or Compliance Officer. 
(American Express 2016, 18). 
As exemplified in the above two examples, firms vary in the type of pronouns used to 
describe the same topic. Prior linguistic studies indicate that pronouns are the most common 
category of function word used in the English language. Pronoun usage can reflect emotional 
states, personality, and other features of social relationships (Chung and Pennebaker 2007; 
Pennebaker et al. 2007). The use of different types of pronouns indicates to whom attention should 
be given. Specifically, use of third-person pronouns (e.g., he/she, they) indicates that attention is 
on others, while the use of first-person pronouns (e.g., I, we) highlights that attention is on 
ourselves as distinct entities (Zimmerman et al. 2013). 
Considering the importance of effective communication to the success of codes of ethics 
and that language plays such a critical role in effective communication, it is important to explore 
how the use of different types of pronouns influences the effectiveness of internal whistleblowing 
policies.  
Language Vividness and First-Person Pronouns 
Vivid language refers to language that “excite[s] the imagination to the extent that it is (1) 
emotionally interesting, (2) concrete and imagery-provoking and (3) proximate in a sensory, 
temporal, or spatial way’’ (Nisbett and Ross 1980, 45). Based on this definition, using first-person 
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pronouns in the company’s Q/A section to describe the employees’ responsibility to report 
observed wrongdoing, where to report, and protection from retaliation is more vivid than using 
third-person pronouns. This is because first-person pronouns are more imagery-provoking and are 
more likely to cause emotional responses (Zimmerman et al. 2013). 
One of the approaches that prior experimental studies use to manipulate language vividness 
is case-history information versus other forms of presentation (Taylor and Thompson 1982). This 
is done by presenting information either in the format of a single case study or in the format of 
base rate information (Hamill et al. 1980). A single case study is more vivid than base rate 
information because it is more concrete and emotionally stimulating (Nisbett and Ross 1980). 
Consistent with this approach, describing the internal whistleblowing policy using first-person 
pronouns lets the reader assume that he/she is the actual person experiencing the specific case 
scenario and consequently leads to greater emotional response. As documented by Seiha et al. 
(2011), when the information format is shifted from the first-person perspective to the third-person 
perspective, it reduces the vividness of spontaneous memories for the participants. Thus, 
describing the internal whistleblowing policy using first-person pronouns is more vivid than if 
third-person pronouns are used.   
Language Vividness and Information Persuasion  
Language vividness may also affect the persuasiveness of information. Nisbett and Ross 
(1980) argue that vividly presented information enhances memory and persuasion. However, 
empirical evidence provides conflicting evidence regarding vividness and information 
persuasiveness. Some studies show that vivid language increases the persuasiveness of information 
(e.g., Collins et al. 1988; Paivio 1969). Other studies do not find a relation between vividness and 
persuasion (e.g., Werner and Latane 1976). Frey and Eagly (1993) argue that vividness can also 
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undermine message processing if the vivid presentation involves elaborate imagery that is 
irrelevant to the message itself. Smith and Shaffer (2000) argue that vividness can undermine or 
enhance message processing depending on vividness congruency. Vividness congruency means 
“the extent to which the vivid elements of a message are congruent with the theme of the message 
itself” (Smith and Shaffer 2000, 769).  
In the corporate internal whistleblowing policy context, the use of first-person pronouns 
increases language vividness and the readers’ emotional reaction. Whether this language vividness 
encourages employees’ reporting intentions or not may depend on the content of the policy. 
Specifically, as discussed earlier, corporate internal whistleblowing policies can consist of a 
Reporting Policy, which includes a description of employees’ reporting responsibility and 
describes reporting channels, and/or an Anti-retaliation Policy, which describes the company’s 
policy against retaliation against employees who report wrongdoing. For the Reporting Policy 
content, first-person pronouns may be more effective in encouraging employees to report than 
third-person pronouns, because first-person pronouns cause employees to have a stronger 
emotional reaction driven by feelings that he/she is the actual person asking the questions and 
receiving the answers.  
For the Anti-retaliation Policy, the effectiveness of first-person pronouns in encouraging 
employees to report wrongdoing is less clear. First-person pronouns may encourage reporting 
intentions as the reader may feel that he/she is the person asking the question of whether he/she 
will be protected from retaliation and being told directly that the company doesn’t tolerate 
retaliation. In contrast, first-person pronouns may decrease reporting intentions because vivid 
descriptions of potential retaliation actions may activate implicit threats of reprisal causing the risk 
of retaliation to become more salient. This increased salience of risk may cause the reader feel 
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more strongly that they will face these potential retaliation threats than if less vivid language in 
the form of third-person pronouns is used. Feelings of increased retaliation risk are incongruent 
with the message that protection is being offered by the company (Wainberg and Perreault 2016). 
As discussed previously, vividness can undermine message processing if it is incongruent with the 
theme of the message. Thus, using first-person pronouns to describe the anti-retaliation policy 
could negatively affect employees’ reporting intentions.  
Consistent with the premise that increased vividness can lead to unanticipated negative 
effects. Wainberg and Perreault (2016) conduct an experiment where they vary the existence of an 
anti-retaliation policy. They find that the presence of an anti-retaliation policy increases the 
salience of retaliatory threats and lowers witnesses’ reporting intentions. Their finding that 
presenting anti-retaliation policy information may adversely affect whistleblowing intentions is 
interesting. A logical follow-up question is what a company should do with its internal 
whistleblowing policy in regard to presenting anti-retaliation information in a way that doesn’t 
impede the willingness of employees to report wrongdoing. This study addresses one potential 
factor that addresses this question. Specifically, it investigates the effect of pronoun type on 
employee responses to an anti-retaliation policy.    
In summary, the effectiveness of the use of first-person pronouns in encouraging 
whistleblowing intentions is contingent upon the specific policy content. First-person pronouns 
should be effective in encouraging employee reporting when they are used in the Reporting Policy 
descriptions of employees’ reporting responsibility and reporting channels. However, in the Anti-
retaliation Policy, using first-person pronouns may decrease employees’ reporting intentions due 
to the increased salience of the retaliation words. Based on the above discussion, the following 
hypotheses are generated: 
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H1: Employees’ reporting intentions are higher when the Reporting Policy uses 
first-person pronouns than when it uses third-person pronouns.  
 
H2: Employees’ reporting intentions are lower when the Anti-retaliation Policy uses 
first-person pronouns than when it uses third-person pronouns.  
Interaction between Reporting Policy Pronouns and Anti-Retaliation Policy Pronouns  
Based on the previous discussion, pronoun type is expected to interact with the information 
content of the policy. As such, the use of first-person pronouns may either increase or decrease 
employees reporting intentions contingent upon the content of the policy where these pronouns 
are used. Another empirical question worth exploring is whether the types of pronouns in the 
Reporting Policy interact with the types of pronouns in the Anti-retaliation Policy. In other words, 
the question arises as to whether the predicted effectiveness of a first-person reporting policy is 
affected by the pronoun usage in the Anti-retaliation Policy.  
In combination, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 suggest that when both the Reporting 
Policy and the Anti-retaliation Policy are included in the internal whistleblowing policy, the most 
effective combination of pronoun use in encouraging reporting intentions will be achieved when 
the Reporting Policy is in first-person and the Anti-retaliation Policy is in third-person. Conversely, 
one would expect that the least effective combination of pronoun use would occur when the 
Reporting Policy is in third-person and the Anti-retaliation Policy is in first-person. This leads to 
my third hypothesis: 
 
H3a: Employees’ reporting intentions are the highest when the Reporting Policy 
uses first-person pronouns and the Anti-retaliation Policy uses third-person 
pronouns.  
 
H3b: Employees’ reporting intentions are the lowest when the Reporting Policy uses 
third-person pronouns and the Anti-retaliation Policy uses first-person pronouns.  
 65 
 
However, it is less clear what will occur with other combinations of pronoun type and 
policy content. When first-person pronouns are used in both the Reporting Policy and the Anti-
retaliation Policy, the language will be more vivid than if first-person pronouns are used in only 
one of the policies. This stronger language vividness may increase reporting intentions if the 
employee focuses on the Reporting Policy or decrease reporting intentions if the employee focuses 
on the Anti-retaliation Policy. When third-person pronouns are used in both the Reporting Policy 
and the Anti-retaliation Policy, the language will be less vivid than if third-person pronouns are 
used in one of the policies. This weaker language vividness may decrease reporting intentions if 
the employee focuses on the Reporting Policy or increase reporting intentions if the employee 
focuses on the Anti-retaliation Policy. Due to the lack of a clear directional prediction in these 
cases, I propose the following research questions:   
RQ1: How will whistleblowing likelihood be affected if both the Reporting Policy 
and the Anti-retaliation Policy are in first person?  
 
RQ2: How will whistleblowing likelihood be affected if both the Reporting Policy 
and the Anti-retaliation Policy are in third person? 
 
Risk Aversion and Vividness of Anti-Retaliation Policy  
People have different attitudes toward things involving risk and uncertainty. Risk aversion 
is defined as the tendency to avoid uncertainties and risks (Blais and Weber 2006), and it is 
considered the central theoretical concept in economics (Blais and Weber 2006). Reporting other 
employees’ wrongdoing is considered risky, and the primary reason why people do not want to 
report misconduct is the fear of reprisal (Wainberg and Perreault 2016). People who are low in 
risk aversion are less likely to be influenced by the risk of retaliation than people who are high in 
risk aversion. Thus, the increased salience of potential retaliation threats due to the use of a first-
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person anti-retaliation policy is less likely to influence risk seeking employees’ reporting 
intentions. Based on the above discussion, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H4: The effect of the first-person pronoun anti-retaliation policy is stronger for 
employees with high risk aversion than for employees with low risk aversion.  
III. METHOD 
 
Design and Participants 
This study employs a 2 x 2 between-subjects design by manipulating the type of pronouns 
used in a corporate ethical violation Reporting Policy (first-person reporting policy or third-person 
reporting policy) and the type of pronouns used in the corporate Anti-retaliation Policy (first-
person anti-retaliation policy or third-person anti-retaliation policy). This experimental design 
generates a total of four experimental treatments (see Table 6). Students from a major southeastern 
university were recruited as voluntary participants in the study and participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the four treatment conditions.4  
Tasks and Procedures 
Participants were presented with a short case involving a hypothetical manufacturing 
company called XOTLE, Inc. (XOTLE). Background information indicates that the company’s 
operating results over the past few years are steady and below industry average. A fraudulent act 
related to revenue recognition was noticed by an employee named Rowan Geoffrey, who is in 
charge of preparing some accounting entries and related financial reports. Rowan finds that his 
boss, Gilbert Elias, (the CFO) engaged in fraudulent financial reporting. After reading the 
background information, participants were presented with XOTLE’s internal whistleblowing 
policy. The policy is organized via “Q/A” format. The first part of the policy is the Reporting 
                                                          
4 Graduate students are used by many recent studies to examine reporting intentions for questionable acts (Ayers and 
Kaplan 2005; Kaplan and Schultz 2007; Kaplan, Pope, and Samuels 2010). 
 67 
 
Policy. The Reporting Policy is in “Q/A” format. It describes the responsibility of XOTLE 
employees to report wrongdoing and the reporting channel. The reporting channel is an anonymous 
hotline administered by the internal auditors of XOTLE, Inc. The hotline is available 24 hours a 
day and 365 days a year. The second part of the policy is the anti-retaliation policy. The Anti-
retaliation Policy is also in “Q/A” format. It describes the company’s anti-retaliation policy. The 
use of pronouns in each section of the company’s internal whistleblowing policy varies across 
treatments as described above.  
After reading the company’s whistleblowing policy, participants were asked to indicate 1) 
Rowan’s likelihood of reporting the wrongdoing, and 2) their likelihood of reporting assuming 
they were in Rowan’s position. Participants then answer a series of follow-up and demographic 
questions (see Appendix C).  
Independent Variables 
Reporting Policy Pronoun Type 
The first independent variable is the type of pronouns used in the company’s reporting 
policy of ethical violations. It is manipulated at two levels (first-person pronouns vs. third-person 
pronouns). Participants who are assigned to the first-person reporting policy group receive the 
following reporting policy:  
Q: If I detect unethical/fraudulent acts, what is my responsibility to speak up? How 
should I raise the concern? 
A: You must speak up promptly if there is any reason to suspect that anyone in the 
company has violated company policies or local laws. Your report will be taken seriously 
and investigated appropriately. It is better to report a suspicion that turns out not to be an 
issue than to ignore a possible violation of the law or Company policy. 
To comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, XOTLE, Inc. maintains an anonymous 
reporting hotline for whistle blowers. You are encouraged to call the hotline. The hotline 
is administered by the internal auditors of XOTLE, Inc. The hotline is available 24 hours 
a day and 365 days a year. The telephone calls made to the hotline are to be reported to 
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the audit committee for further investigation. The identity and any information about 
youwill be kept strictly confidential. 
Participants who are assigned to the third-person reporting policy group face the same reporting 
policy as presented above except that the first-person pronouns are replaced with third-person 
pronouns.  
Q: If an employee detects unethical/fraudulent acts, what is his/her responsibility to speak 
up? How should he/she raise the concern? 
A: He/she must speak up promptly if there is any reason to suspect that anyone in the 
company has violated company policies or local laws. His/Her report will be taken 
seriously and investigated appropriately. It is better to report a suspicion that turns out not 
to be an issue than to ignore a possible violation of the law or Company policy. 
To comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, XOTLE, Inc. maintains an anonymous 
reporting hotline for whistle blowers. He/She is encouraged to call the hotline. The 
hotline is administered by the internal auditors of XOTLE, Inc. The hotline is available 
24 hours a day and 365 days a year. The telephone calls made to the hotline are to be 
reported to the audit committee for further investigation. The identity and any 
information about him/her will be kept strictly confidential. 
Anti-Retaliation Policy Pronoun Type 
The second independent variable is the type of pronouns used in the company’s anti-
retaliation policy. It is also manipulated at two levels (first-person pronouns vs. third-person 
pronouns). Participants who are assigned to the first-person anti-retaliation policy group receive 
the following reporting policy:   
Q: If I report a fraud, will I be protected from retaliation? 
A: All responses are kept anonymous. You will not be subject to intimidation or 
retaliation. This includes being left out, managerial or coworker abuse, threatening 
behavior, harassment, loss of job or promotion, or any other professional, personal, or 
financial form of retaliation both now and in the future. 
If you believe that you are being retaliated against, you should report such conduct 
immediately to the Human Resources Department. Any individual who unlawfully 
discriminates or retaliates against you as a result of the protected actions may be subject 
to disciplinary action, up to and including immediate termination. 
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Participants who are assigned to the third-person anti-retaliation policy group receive the same 
anti-retaliation policy as presented above except that the first-person pronouns are replaced with 
third-person pronouns.  
Q: If an employee reports a fraud, will he/she be protected from retaliation? 
A: All responses are kept anonymous. He/She will not be subject to intimidation or 
retaliation. This includes being left out, managerial or coworker abuse, threatening 
behavior, harassment, loss of job or promotion, or any other professional, personal, or 
financial form of retaliation both now and in the future. 
If he/she believes that he/she is being retaliated against, he/she should report such 
conduct immediately to the Human Resources Department. Any individual who 
unlawfully discriminates or retaliates against him/her as a result of the protected actions 
may be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including immediate termination. 
Dependent Variables 
The primary dependent variable in this study is measured by asking the participants’ the 
following two questions:  
1. Given this situation, how likely is it that someone in Rowan’s position would report 
the CFO’s fraudulent act?  
2. .Now imagine you are facing this situation. How likely is it that you would report the 
CFO’s fraudulent act?”  
Participants respond on a scale from 0 (definitely would not report) to 10 (definitely would report).  
Follow-up Questions and Demographic Information 
Following the dependent variables assessment, the questionnaire includes measurement of 
risk aversion, vividness of the whistleblowing policy, perceptions of the fraudulent act, and 
demographic information. In this study, participants’ risk aversion is measured with a six-item 
scale based on the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking attitude developed by Weber et al. (2002).5 Item 
1, 3, and 5 belong to the domain of financial gambling risk. Item 2, 4, and 6 belong to the domain 
                                                          
5 Prior research suggests that psychological test results based on survey questions are a reliable and valid approach 
of measuring individuals’ risk aversion (Ekelund et al. 2005). 
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of financial investment risk. These six items are assessed on a 7-point Likert-type scale. The 
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale is a stable measurement of risk taking attitude used in many 
studies (Zhang et al. 2011; Hu and Xie 2012; Zhang et al. 2016).  
Vividness of the whistleblowing policy is measured with a four-item scale based on Kelly 
et al. (1989) and Nagaraj (2007) (see Appendix C). Similar to prior research (e.g., Kaplan et al. 
2009; Zhang et al. 2013; Brink et al. 2013), the instrument also includes several questions to that 
assess participant perceptions the fraudulent act, such as the perceived vividness of the policy, the 
seriousness of the fraud, the responsibility to report, and the risk of retaliation. At the end of the 
questionnaire, e ants’ demographic information, such as gender, age, and education are collected 
for further analysis (see Appendix C for a complete list of questions included in the research 
instrument).6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 The instrument does not include direct questions to check the manipulation of first vs. third-person pronouns, as 
prior research indicates that the effect of different types of pronouns in a narrative disclosure is subconscious 
(Pennebaker 2011; Assay working). Thus, it would be confusing to ask participants about the type of pronouns in 
the internal whistleblowing policy as they will not likely register this consciously. In the manipulations, the only 
difference between treatment groups are the type of pronouns. All other features are held constant. Thus, a 
systematic reporting intention difference between groups should indicate that the type of pronouns used influenced 
participant decision making. 
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IV. RESULTS 
 
Post-Experiment Questions 
A total of 163 participants completed the experimental survey. Participants’ demographic 
information is summarized in Table 3.1. The average participant age was 28 and the average work 
experience was 5.1 years. Approximately 48 percent of respondents were female, 52 percent were 
male, 32 percent were undergraduate students, 68 percent were graduate students. Twenty-four 
percent of the participants indicated they had discovered a person of greater authority engaged in 
questionable behaviors. Twenty-three participants reported that English was not their first 
language. Participants whose first language are not English may not be sensitive to the types of 
pronouns used in a context. Thus, they are excluded from subsequent analyses. When included as 
covariates, none of the above demographic variables were significant. Therefore, demographic 
variables are not included as covariates in subsequent analyses. 
Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics for whistleblowing intentions measurement, and 
questions measuring participants’ perception of the wrongdoing. Results show that the mean first-
person reporting intention is 8.26, and the mean third-person reporting intention is 6.34. Table 3.2 
also reports the descriptive statistics about participants’ perception of the seriousness of the 
wrongdoing (mean 6.03), the personal cost of reporting (mean 4.21), the likelihood that there 
would be negative repercussions (mean 3.87), the likelihood of hurting the promotion (mean 3.99), 
the chance of being retaliated (mean 3.96), the responsibility to report (mean 6.41), the likelihood 
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that the company will thoroughly investigate the case (mean 4.93), the company will correct the 
wrongdoing (mean 4.94), and the level of disciplinary actions against wrongdoer (mean 5.39).  
Table 3.3, Panel A reports the descriptive statistics and factor loading of language vividness 
measurement and risk aversion measurement. Each of the four items measuring the language 
vividness shows a minimum of 0.5 loading, and a strongly loading item is generally a 0.5 loading 
or higher (Costello and Osborne 2005). As discussed earlier, our risk aversion measurement has 
two domains: financial gambling risk domain and financial investment risk domain. As displayed 
in Panel A, Table 3.3, each of the financial gambling risk domain items (the first, third, and fifth 
item) enjoys a factor loading higher than 0.8, while each of the financial investment risk domain 
(the second, fourth, and sixth item) has a factor loading lower than 0.34. Weber et al. (2002) 
documented that the difference between these two domains is the level of control over the risk, 
and financial gambling risk is less controllable than financial investment risk. In our study, the risk 
involves the possibility of retaliation from the firm, which is difficult to control. Thus, I retain only 
the financial gambling risk domain items (the first, third, and fifth item) for future analysis. Table 
3.3, Panel B reports the measurement reliability of the language vividness and risk aversion. The 
Cronbach’s α of the two constructs are above 0.7, indicating adequate reliability (Nunnally 1978).    
Hypothesis Testing and Research Question Analysis 
Table 3.4 reports the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) findings with reporting intentions as 
the dependent variable7. H1 predicts reporting intentions will be higher when the Reporting Policy 
is worded in first-person than when it is worded in third-person. Table 3.2, Panel A shows that the 
reporting intention is higher when the company’s Reporting Policy is worded in first-person than 
                                                          
7 Dependent Variable: ‘‘How likely is it that you would report the CFO’s fraudulent act?’’ scaled using an 11-point 
ascending scale (endpoints labeled ‘‘Extremely Unlikely’’ and ‘‘Extremely 
Likely’’). 
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when it is in third-person (8.57 versus 7.93) and the difference is significant (F = 3.87, p = 0.05). 
Thus, H1 is supported.  
H2 predicts that reporting intentions will be lower when the Anti-Retaliation Policy is 
worded in first-person han when it is in third-person. The main effect of the Anti-Retaliation Policy 
Pronouns is not significant (F = 0.21, p = 0.65). Thus, H2 is not supported. H3a predicts that 
reporting intentions will be the highest when Reporting Policy is in first-person and the anti-
retaliation policy is in third-person. H3b predicts that the reporting intentions will be the lowest 
when Reporting Policy is in third-person and the anti-retaliation policy is in first-person. The 
results of a one-way ANOVA do not indicate that whistleblowing intention in one treatment is 
significantly higher than other treatments (F = 1.59, p = 0.19). Thus, H3a and H3b are not 
supported. RQ1 and RQ2 investigate whether the types of pronouns in Reporting Policy interact 
with the types of pronouns in Anti-Retaliation Policy. As shown in Table 3.2 Panel A, there are 
no significant interactions between the two independent variables (F = 0.74, p = 0.39).  
H4 predicts that the effect of the first-person pronoun anti-retaliation policy is stronger for 
employees with high risk aversion than for employees with low risk aversion. The median value 
of the risk aversion variable is 3.0. The participants are classified as either low risk seeking or high 
risk seeking base on a median split. The ANOVA analysis with Anti-Retaliation Policy Pronouns 
and Risk Aversion as independent variables show that there is no significant interaction between 
the two variables (F = 1.39, p = 0.24). Thus, H4 is not supported.  
Supplemental Analyses  
Vividness of the Policy Mediation 
 As discussed earlier, the post-experiment questionnaire includes several questions to 
measure participants’ perception of the vividness of the whistleblowing policy. Participants are 
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asked to rate how precise the policy is, how clear the policy is, how specific the policy is, and if 
they feel the policy is applicable to them. The variation of the types of pronouns used in companies’ 
Reporting Policy may influence employees’ perception of the vividness of the policy and in turn 
affect reporting intentions. In other words, the perceived vividness of the policy is predicted to 
mediate the Reporting Policy pronouns’ effect on reporting intentions.  
I use the PROCESS add-on in SPSS to examine the mediating effect (Hayes 2013). As 
Figure 3.1 illustrates, the standardized regression coefficient between Reporting Policy Pronouns 
and Language Vividness is statistically significant (Beta = -0.31, p < 0.05), as was the standardized 
regression coefficient between Language Vividness and Reporting Intentions (Beta =0.55, p < 
0.05). Reporting Policy Pronouns is significantly correlated with Reporting Intentions (Beta = -
0.31, p < 0.05). The relationship between Reporting Policy Pronouns and Reporting Intentions is 
diminished when the relationships between Reporting Policy Pronouns and Language Vividness 
and between Language Vividness and Reporting Intentions are controlled (reduced from Beta = 
-.31, p < 0.05 to Beta = -0.14, p = 0.41). The standardized indirect effect was (-0.31) (0.55) = -
0.17. I test the significance of this indirect effect using normal theory tests in PROCESS. Results 
show that the indirect effect is significant (Beta = -0.17, p = 0.01)8. Thus, Language Vividness 
fully mediates the Reporting Policy Pronouns’ effect on Reporting Intentions.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 I also employ the Baron and Kenny (1986) approach to test the model. Results support that Language Vividness 
fully mediates the Reporting Policy Pronouns’ effect on Reporting Intentions.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
Companies’ codes of ethics potentially play an important role in guiding employees 
towards making the right decision when they encounter unethical behaviors. Firms exert effort to 
communicate the code of ethics with employees. Often employees are required to be familiar with 
the code, and may be required to undergo training specifically related to the code of ethics. Despite 
these efforts, the effectiveness of codes of ethics in encouraging desired employee behaviors is not 
conclusive (Kaptein and Schwartz 2008). One of the key issues for a code of ethics’ success is 
effective communication (Stevens 2008). Pronouns plays an important role in effective 
communication. The purpose of the present study is to examine whether different types of 
pronouns used in the Reporting Policy and different types of pronouns used in the Anti-Retaliation 
policy influence employees’ reporting intentions.  
Results indicate that first-person pronouns encourage employee reporting intentions when 
they are used in the Reporting Policy. However, the results do not provide evidence that Anti-
Retaliation policy pronoun type significantly affects reporting intentions. Mediation analysis 
indicates that participants’ perceived vividness of the policy completely mediates the first-person 
Reporting Policy’s effect on employees’ reporting intentions. 
These results suggest that firms desiring to motivate employees should pay attention, not 
only to the content of the ethics policy, but also to the linguistic vividness of the policy. Using 
first-person pronouns in the Reporting Policy may improve the vividness of the policy, and 
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ultimately influence employees’ reporting intentions. However, pronoun type in the Anti-
Retaliation Policy doesn’t seem to influence employees’ reporting intentions. As the Reporting 
Policy is usually displayed before the Anti-Retaliation Policy, participants may be most influenced 
by pronoun type in the Reporting Policy. Future research could test this potential order effect by 
only including the Anti-Retaliation Policy in the experimental design.  
Language plays an important role in effective communication of the internal reporting 
policy. Future research can explore other language characteristics that help shape the most 
effective internal reporting policy, such as readability, use of uncertainty words, etc.  
This study has a number of limitations. First, this study uses an experimental approach with 
limited information provided to participants in each case. Participants’ reports may be different in 
“real life”. However, the hypotheses rely on the differences among treatments instead of absolute 
levels. Thus, this limitation diminishes. Second, the internal reporting policy investigated in this 
study only focuses on the Reporting Policy and the Anti-retaliation Policy. A full internal reporting 
policy also includes investigative procedures, who is covered by the policy, etc. Third, there are 
many types of fraudulent acts in practice, this study only examines one fraud case. Inferences from 
this study may be limited.  
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Table 1.1 - Summary of studies on characteristics of the whistleblower 
 
CITATION JOURNAL 
RESEARCH 
METHOD 
SAMPLE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
KEY RESULTS 
Curtis and 
Taylor 
(2009)  
Accounting 
and the 
Public 
Interest 
Within-
subjects 
scenario-based 
survey  
122 auditors 
Locus of control 
and ethical style 
whistleblowing 
intentions 
Auditors with an internal 
locus of control and 
auditors who exhibit a 
judging ethical style are 
more likely to report. 
Dalton and 
Radtke 
(2013)  
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
2 by 1 
between-
subjects design  
116 MBA 
students  
Machiavellianism  
whistleblowing 
intentions 
Machiavellianism is 
negatively related to 
whistle-blowing. 
Brink et al. 
(2015a)  
Journal of 
Forensic and 
Investigative 
Accounting 
2 by 1 
between-
subjects 
experiment  
 54 
accounting 
students 
Personality traits, 
ethical position, 
and wrongdoing 
materiality  
whistleblowing 
intentions 
There is a positive relation 
between the presence of 
higher levels of the alpha 
and beta meta-traits and 
whistle-blowing behaviors; 
individuals with idealistic 
ethical position are more 
likely to report than 
individuals with relativistic 
ethical position. 
Kaplan et al. 
(2009) 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
2 by 2 
between-
subjects design  
118 MBA 
students 
Gender and 
reporting channel  
whistleblowing 
intentions 
They find that female 
participants’ reporting 
intentions are higher than 
for male participants only 
under the anonymous 
reporting channel 
condition.   
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Liyanarachc
hi and Adler 
(2011) 
Australian 
Accounting 
Review 
Quisi-
experiment 
2000 
Australian 
accountants  
Age and Gender 
whistleblowing 
intentions 
Among early career 
accountants, male 
accountants are more 
likely than female 
accountants to blow the 
whistle; when accountants 
are at the age group of 45 
or above, female 
accountants’ reporting 
intention in this age group 
tends to decline as the 
retaliation threat increases. 
In contrast, the change in 
retaliation threat has little 
impact on male 
accountants’ reporting 
intention. 
Erkmen et 
al. (2014) 
Journal of 
Accounting 
& 
Organization
al Change 
Survey  
116 
accounting 
professionals 
Age and types of 
wrongdoing  
whistleblowing 
intentions 
Female accounting 
professionals are more 
likely to blow the whistle 
than male accounting 
professionals when the 
fraud involves fake 
invoices, and older 
accounting professionals 
are more likely to blow the 
whistle than younger 
professionals when the 
fraud involves 
misclassification of sales 
and profits. 
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Table 1.2 - Summary of Studies on characteristics of the report recipient 
  
CITATION JOURNAL 
RESEARCH 
METHOD 
SAMPLE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
KEY RESULTS 
Kaplan et 
al. (2010) 
Behavioral 
Research in 
Accounting 
2 by 2 between-
subjects design  
96 MBA 
students 
Social 
confrontation 
and recipient 
power status 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
The witness’ reporting 
intentions to the supervisor’s 
supervisor are stronger than 
to an internal auditor when 
there is unsuccessful social 
confrontation with the 
supervisor.   
Kaplan et 
al. (2011)  
Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice & 
Theory 
2 by 2 by 2 
between-
subjects design  
207 MBA 
students 
Auditor inquiry, 
reporting 
channel  
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
Participants’ whistleblowing 
intentions to an inquiring 
auditor are stronger than their 
whistleblowing intentions to 
a non-inquiring auditor and 
their whistleblowing 
intention to an internal 
auditor are stronger than their 
intentions to an external 
auditor.  
Kaplan and 
Schultz 
(2007) 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
2 by 2 by 3 
mixed design  
90 MBA 
students 
Anonymous 
reporting 
channel, 
different fraud 
cases 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
 The existence of an 
anonymous channel does 
reduce the likelihood of 
reporting to non-anonymous 
channels. 
Curtis and 
Taylor 
(2009)  
Accounting 
and the 
Public 
Interest 
within-subjects 
scenario-based 
survey  
122 in-
charge 
level 
auditors 
Identity 
disclosure, locus 
of control and 
ethical style 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
Reporting intention is 
significantly lower under a 
disclosed identity format, and 
there was no significant 
difference in reporting 
intention between 
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anonymous and protected 
identity formats.  
Kaplan et 
al. (2012)  
Advances in 
Accounting, 
incorporating 
Advances in 
International 
Accounting 
2×2×2 repeated 
measures 
design 
81 MBA 
students 
Reporting 
channel, 
retaliation to the 
previous 
whistleblower, 
and transgressor 
repercussions 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
Witnesses’ reporting 
intention to anonymous 
channel is higher than non-
anonymous channel only 
when previous 
whistleblowing outcome is 
negative.  
Kaplan et 
al. (2009)  
Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice & 
Theory 
2 by 1 between-
subjects design  
37 MBA 
students 
Anonymous 
Hotline 
Administrator 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
Reporting intentions to the 
internal hotline are 
significantly higher 
compared to the external 
hotline. 
Zhang et 
al. (2013)  
Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice & 
Theory 
2 by 2 between-
subjects design  
130 MBA 
students 
Anonymous 
Hotline 
Administrator, 
Previous 
Whistleblowing 
Outcomes 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
Participants’ reporting 
intentions to an external 
hotline are higher when the 
organization has a history of 
poor responsiveness to 
whistleblowing and when 
participants are low on the 
proactivity scale.  
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Table 1.3 - Summary of studies on characteristics of the wrongdoer 
  
CITATION JOURNAL 
RESEARCH 
METHOD 
SAMPLE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
KEY RESULTS 
Kaplan 
(1995)  
Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice & 
Theory 
2 by 2 
between-
subjects 
experimental 
design 
57 Audit 
seniors 
Audit staff work 
history, audit step 
necessity  
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
Auditors’ reporting intention are 
significantly stronger when the 
wrongdoer has poor work history 
and when the audit step is 
necessary. 
Robertson 
et al. 
(2011)  
Behavioral 
Research in 
Accounting 
2 by 2 
between-
subjects 
experimental 
design 
181 
auditors 
Likeability 
reputation, 
performance 
reputation 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
There is less reporting intention 
when the wrongdoer has good 
performance reputation than poor 
performance reputation, and less 
reporting intention when the 
wrongdoer is more likeable. 
Taylor and 
Curtis 
(2013) 
Behavioral 
Research in 
Accounting 
2 by 2 
between-
subjects 
experimental 
design 
106 
senior-
level 
auditors 
Organizational 
Response, power 
distance 
whistleblowing 
intentions 
Auditors’ are more likely to blow 
the whistle when the wrongdoer 
is a co-worker than when he is 
the supervisor only if the 
previous organizational response 
is weak; if the organizational 
response is strong, auditors are 
more likely to report supervisor 
than co-worker.  
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Table 1.4 - Summary of studies on characteristics of the wrongdoing   
  
CITATION JOURNAL 
RESEARCH 
METHOD 
SAMPLE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
KEY RESULTS 
Kaplan and 
Schultz 
(2007)  
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
2 by 2 by 3 
mixed design  
90 MBA 
students 
Anonymous 
reporting channel, 
different fraud 
cases 
whistleblowing 
intentions 
Reporting intentions are lower 
under financial statement fraud 
than under theft case condition 
Robinson 
et al. 
(2012)  
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
2 by 2 
between-
subjects 
design 
181 
auditors 
Likeability 
reputation, 
performance 
reputation 
whistleblowing 
intentions 
Employees are less likely to 
report: financial statement fraud 
than theft; immaterial than 
material financial 
statement fraud 
Kaplan et 
al. (2009)  
Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice & 
Theory 
2 by 2 
between-
subjects 
design  
103 MBA 
students 
Procedural 
safeguards (strong 
or weak) and the 
type of fraudulent 
act  
whistleblowing 
intentions 
There is a stronger reporting 
intention for misappropriation 
of assets compared to 
fraudulent financial reporting 
only when the reporting channel 
is anonymous.  
Kaplan et 
al. (2011)  
Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice & 
Theory 
2 by 2 by 2 
between-
subjects 
design  
207 MBA 
students 
Type of fradulent 
act, auditor 
inquiry, reporting 
channel  
whistleblowing 
intentions 
There is no systematic 
difference between the two 
different types of fraudulent 
acts, misappropriation of assets 
and fraudulent financial, nor 
does the type of fraudulent act 
interact with whether the 
auditor engages in inquiry or 
the report recipient.  
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Brink et al. 
(2013)  
Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice & 
Theory 
2 by 2 
between-
subjects 
design 
81 MBA 
students 
Strength of 
Evidence, and 
whistleblowing 
Incentives 
whistleblowing 
intentions 
The likelihood of reporting 
internally is greater than to the 
SEC. When evidence is strong, 
internal rewards increase 
reporting to SEC; and when 
evidence is weak the presence 
of an internal incentive 
decreases SEC reporting 
intentions.  
Brink et al. 
(2015b)  
Advances in 
Accounting 
Behavioral 
Research  
2 by 2 
between-
subjects 
design 
137 MBA 
and 
Masters 
level 
accounting 
students 
Strength of 
evidence, other 
employees 
‘awareness of the 
act 
whistleblowing 
intentions 
When there is strong evidence 
indicating a fraudulent act, 
individuals with sole knowledge 
are more likely to report than 
when others are aware of the 
fraudulent act (the bystander 
effect). However, the bystander 
effect is not found when 
evidence of fraud is weak. 
Brink et al. 
(2015a)  
Journal of 
Forensic and 
Investigative 
Accounting 
2 by 1 
between-
subjects 
design  
 54 
accounting 
students 
Wrongdoing 
materiality, 
personality traits, 
and ethical 
position 
whistleblowing 
intentions 
Materiality of the problem 
influences witness’ reporting 
intentions through its positive 
association with higher 
idealistic orientation and higher 
levels of the alpha and beta 
meta-traits. 
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Table 1.5 - Summary of studies on characteristics of the organization 
 
CITATION JOURNAL 
RESEARCH 
METHOD 
SAMPLE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
KEY RESULTS 
Wainberg 
and 
Perreault 
(2016)  
Behavioral 
Research in 
Accounting 
2 by 2 
between-
subjects  
68 graduate 
students 
Anti-retaliation 
policy and job 
security  
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
Vivid anti-retaliation policy 
may actually have the opposite 
of the intended effect and 
lowers whistleblower’ reporting 
intention, because it increases 
the salience of retaliatory 
threats.  
Zhang et 
al. (2013)  
Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice & 
Theory 
2 by 2 
between-
subjects  
130 MBA 
students 
Anonymous 
Hotline 
Administrator, 
Previous 
Whistleblowing 
Outcomes 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
When organizations have a 
history of negative outcome to 
previous whistleblowers and 
when witnesses are low on 
proactivity scale, the witnesses 
are less likely to report to 
internal hotlines but more likely 
to report to external hotline.  
Taylor and 
Curtis 
(2013)  
Behavioral 
Research in 
Accounting 
2 by 2 
between-
subjects  
106 senior-
level auditors 
Organizational 
Response, power 
distance 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
When organizational response 
is strong, the witnesses are 
more likely to report 
supervisors than peers. Without 
strong organizational response, 
they are more likely to report 
peers than supervisors.  
Dalton and 
Radtke 
(2013) 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
2 by 1 
between -
subjects 
116 MBA 
students  
Machiavellianism 
and ethical 
environment 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
Organization’s ethical 
environment increases 
witnesses’ reporting especially 
when the witnesses are high in 
Machiavellianism.  
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Xu and 
Ziegenfuss 
(2008)  
Journal of 
Business and 
Psychology 
2 by 1 
between-
subjects 
201 internal 
auditors 
Cash reward, 
employment 
contract reward 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
Internal auditors are more 
likely to report wrongdoing 
when cash reward or 
employment contract reward 
are provided 
Brink et al. 
(2013)  
Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice & 
Theory 
2 by 2 
between-
subjects 
81 MBA 
students 
Internal reward 
Incentives, 
Strength of 
Evidence 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
The likelihood of reporting 
internally is greater than to the 
SEC. When evidence is strong, 
internal rewards increase 
reporting to SEC; and when 
evidence is weak the presence 
of an internal incentive 
decreases SEC reporting 
intentions.  
Seifert et 
al. (2010)  
Accounting, 
Organizations 
and Society 
2 by 2 by 2 
between-
subjects 
447 internal 
auditors and 
management 
accountants 
Organizational 
justice 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
Organizational procedural 
justice, distributive justice, and 
interactional justice increase 
the likelihood that an 
organizational accountant 
would internally report 
financial statement fraud. 
Brennan 
and Kelly 
(2007)  
British 
Accounting 
Review 
Survey  240 trainee 
auditors 
Organizational 
structures 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
Having formal structures is 
positively associated with 
employees’ reporting intention. 
Training offered by 
organization increases 
employees’ reporting 
confidence. 
Lowe et al. 
(2013)  
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
2 by 2 
between-
subjects 
76 MBA 
students 
Financial sub-
certification 
procedure 
Whistleblowing 
intentions 
The witnesses with knowledge 
of a superior who committed a 
fraudulent act and certified that 
there is no fraud have lower 
reporting intentions. 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Linguistic Variables 
Pronouns: 
First person: I me mine my we us our ours 
Second person: you your yours 
Third person: He she him her his hers they them their theirs 
Uncertainty words: 
could may maybe might perhaps possibilities possibility possible possibly probabilistic 
probabilities probability probable probably sometime sometimes somewhat somewhere 
Tone:  
Negativity: don’t disappoint disappoints disappointing disappointed disappointment risk risks 
risky threat threats threaten threatened threatening penalty penalties negative negatives 
negatively fail fails failed failing failure weak weakness weaknesses weaken weakens weakening 
weakened difficult difficulty hurdle hurdles obstacle obstacles slump slumps slumping slumped 
uncertain uncertainty uncertainties unsettled unfavorable downturn depressed down decrease 
decreases decreasing decreased decline declines declining declined fall falls falling fell fallen 
drop drops dropping dropped deteriorate deteriorates deteriorating deteriorated worsen worsens 
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worsening worse worst low lower lowest less least smaller smallest shrink shrinks shrinking 
shrunk below under challenge challenges challenging challenged poor poorly 
Positivity: do pleased delighted reward rewards rewarding rewarded opportunity opportunities 
enjoy enjoys enjoying enjoyed encouraged encouraging positive positives success successes 
successful successfully succeed succeeds succeeding succeeded accomplish accomplishes 
accomplishing accomplished accomplishment accomplishments strong strength strengths certain 
certainty definite solid excellent stellar good leading achieve achieves achieved achieving 
achievement achievements progress progressing deliver delivers delivered delivering leader 
leading up increase increases increasing increased rise rises rising rose risen double doubled 
doubles improve improves improving improved improvement improvements enhance enhances 
enhanced enhancing enhancement enhancements strengthen strengthens strengthening 
strengthened stronger strongest strongly better best more most above record high higher highest 
greater greatest larger largest grow grows growing grew grown growth expand expands 
expanding expanded expansion exceed exceeds exceeded exceeding beat beats beating 
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Table 2.1 Content Characteristics 
 
General content, scope, and tone 
Executive letter 
Executives opening letter  
Executives pictures in the opening letter 
Importance of the policy  
 
Read and understand the policy 
Read and understand the policy affirmation 
Policy training 
Policy Compliance affirmation 
Understand the policy is the condition of employment 
Comprehension aid  
 
Q/A or FAQ 
Case scenario 
Decision assistance tool 
Who, what, and where 
Who is covered by the policy? 
Employees 
Executives 
Entire group 
Board of directors  
Contract worker or temporary worker 
Business partners 
What is the responsibility? 
 
Employee responsibility-ask questions 
Employee responsibility-report concerns 
Employee responsibility-report concerns even if no problem 
found 
Employee responsibility-report concerns in good faith 
Managers responsibility-create environment 
Managers responsibility-lead by example 
Managers responsibility-maintain no retaliation policy 
Managers responsibility-respond to report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where to report? 
 
Audit committee 
Compliance or Ethics 
Coworker 
Finance/Accounting department 
Executives 
External auditor 
Hotlines 
Internal audit 
Legal division 
Supervisors 
Ombudsperson 
Security office 
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Third Party 
HR 
Implicit order 
Explicit order 
Anonymous reporting 
What is the reporting media? 
 
Fax 
Email 
Mail 
Phone 
Text 
Website 
 
Investigation procedures, wrongdoer disciplinary action, and anti-retaliation policy  
Investigation procedures 
Investigation procedures-general statement 
Investigation procedures-witness cooperation 
Investigation procedures-witness no misleading information 
Investigation procedures-punishment of witness misleading 
investigation 
Investigation procedures-corrective action mentioned 
Investigation procedures-external investigation 
issues(government) 
Investigation procedures-confidentiality and anonymity 
Wrongdoer 
 
Wrongdoers-including failure to report 
Wrongdoers-including manager failure to detect 
Wrongdoers-include managers ignorance 
Mention of disciplinary action 
Mention of disciplinary action-Termination of job 
Mention of disciplinary action- legal punishment 
Mention of disciplinary action- Monetary loss 
Anti-retaliation policy 
 
Protection from retaliation- General statement 
Protection from retaliation- Good Faith 
Protection from retaliation- Good Faith-definition of good 
faith 
Protection from retaliation- Investigation 
Protection from retaliation- list of retaliations 
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be punished 
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be punished-Job 
termination 
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be punished-
legal action 
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Table 2.2 Content Characteristics Percent Out of the Total Sample  
Panel A: General content, scope, and tone 
 n (total sample = 
50) 
Percen
t 
General content, scope, and tone 
Executive letter Executives opening letter  39 78% 
Executives pictures in the opening letter  29 58% 
 
 
Importance of 
the policy  
 
Read and understand the policy 
 
39 
 
78% 
Policy Compliance affirmation 16 32% 
Policy training 30 60% 
Understand the policy is the condition of 
employment 
4 8% 
 
 
Comprehension 
aid  
 
Q/A or FAQ 
 
32 
 
64% 
Case scenario 5 10% 
Decision assistance tool 31 62% 
Panel B: Who, what, and where 
Who, what, and where 
 
 
Who is covered 
by the policy? 
Employees 50 100% 
Executives 4 8% 
Entire group 21 42% 
Board of directors  31 62% 
Contract worker or temporary worker 18 36% 
Business partners 14 28% 
 
Employee responsibility-ask questions 
 
43 
 
86% 
Employee responsibility-report concerns 49 98% 
Employee responsibility-report concerns even 
no problem found 
8 16% 
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What is the 
responsibility? 
Employee responsibility-report concerns in 
good faith 
25 50% 
Managers responsibility-create environment 28 56% 
Managers responsibility-lead by example 24 48% 
Managers responsibility-maintain no 
retaliation policy 
2 4% 
Managers responsibility-respond to report 23 46% 
 
 
 
 
Where to 
report? 
 
Audit committee 
 
13 
 
26% 
Compliance or Ethics 41 82% 
Coworker 2 4% 
Finance/Accounting department 8 16% 
Executives 11 22% 
External auditor 3 6% 
Hotlines 11 22% 
Internal audit 14 28% 
Legal division 36 72% 
Supervisors 48 96% 
Ombudsperson 7 14% 
Security office 9 18% 
Third Party 15 30% 
HR 40 80% 
Implicit order 33 66% 
Explicit order 11 22% 
Anonymous reporting 42 84% 
 
 
 
What is the 
reporting 
media? 
 
Fax 
 
8 
 
16% 
Email 22 44% 
Mail 18 36% 
Phone 41 82% 
Text 1 2% 
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Website 24 48% 
Panel C: Investigation procedures, wrongdoer disciplinary action, and anti-retaliation 
policy 
Investigation procedures, wrongdoer disciplinary action, and anti-retaliation policy 
 
 
 
 
Investigation 
procedures 
Investigation procedures-general statement 33 66% 
Investigation procedures-witness cooperation 31 62% 
Investigation procedures-witness no 
misleading information 
11 22% 
Investigation procedures-punishment of 
witness misleading investigation 
6 12% 
Investigation procedures-corrective action 
mentioned 
6 12% 
Investigation procedures-external investigation 
issues(government) 
9 18% 
Investigation procedures-confidentiality and 
anonymity 
26 52% 
 
               
Wrongdoer 
 
Wrongdoers-including failure to report 
 
13 
 
26% 
Wrongdoers-including managers’ failure to 
detect 
4 8% 
Wrongdoers-include managers’ ignorance 10 20% 
Mention of disciplinary action 45 90% 
Mention of disciplinary action-Termination of 
job 
42 84% 
Mention of disciplinary action- legal 
punishment 
17 34% 
Mention of disciplinary action- Monetary loss 4 8% 
 
Protection from retaliation- General statement 
 
48 
 
96% 
Protection from retaliation- Good Faith 41 82% 
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Anti-retaliation 
policy 
Protection from retaliation- Good Faith-
definition of good faith 
9 18% 
Protection from retaliation- Investigation 4 8% 
Protection from retaliation- list of retaliations 10 20% 
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be 
punished 
18 36% 
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be 
punished-Job termination 
15 30% 
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be 
punished-legal action 
4 8% 
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Table 2.3 Content Characteristics in Companies' Internal Whistleblowing Policy 
Panel A: Content Characteristics Words Percent 
 Number of words Percent  
General content, scope, and tone   
Executive letter 11,074 9.8%  
Importance of the 
policy  4,555 4.0%  
Comprehension aid  32,571 28.8%  
    
Who, what, and 
where    
Who is covered by 
the policy? 3,866 3.4%  
What is the 
responsibility? 14,540 12.8%  
Where to report? 24,534 21.7%  
What is the 
reporting media? 5,006 4.4%  
    
Investigation procedures, wrongdoer disciplinary action, and anti-retaliation policy  
Investigation 
procedures 5,928 5.2%  
Wrongdoer 
disciplinary action 3,861 3.4%  
Anti-retaliation 
policy 7,239 6.4%  
    
Total 113,174 100.0%  
    
Panel B: Content Characteristics Words Percent within Each Content Category  
  
Number of 
words Percent 
General content, scope, and tone   
 
Importance of the 
policy  
 
Read and understand the policy 1,619 35.5% 
Read and understand the policy affirmation 716 15.7% 
Policy training 1,620 35.6% 
Policy Compliance affirmation 490 10.8% 
Understand the policy is the condition of 
employment 110 2.4% 
Total  4,555 100.0% 
Comprehension aid  
 
Q 9,811 30.1% 
A 17,561 53.9% 
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Case scenario 2,011 6.2% 
Decision assistance tool 3,188 9.8% 
Total  32,571 100.0% 
    
Who, what, and 
where    
 
 
Who is covered by 
the policy? 
Employees 1,249 32.3% 
Executives 107 2.8% 
Entire group 649 16.8% 
Board of directors  873 22.6% 
Contract worker or temporary worker 366 9.5% 
Business partners 622 16.1% 
Total 3,866 100.0% 
What is the 
responsibility? 
 
Employee responsibility-ask questions 2,642 18.2% 
Employee responsibility-report concerns 7,233 49.7% 
Employee responsibility-report concerns even no 
problem found 459 3.2% 
Employee responsibility-report concerns in good 
faith 881 6.1% 
Employee responsibility total 11,215 77.1% 
Managers responsibility-creat environment 1,004 6.9% 
Managers responsibility-lead by example 690 4.7% 
Managers responsibility-maintain no retaliation 
policy 140 1.0% 
Managers responsibility-respond to report 1,491 10.3% 
Managers responsibility total  3,325 22.9% 
Employee and manager responsibility total 14,540 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
Where to report? 
 
Anonymous reporting 3,048 12.4% 
Audit committee 622 2.5% 
Compliance or Ethics 4,053 16.5% 
Coworker 1 0.0% 
Executives 224 0.9% 
External auditor 60 0.2% 
Finance/Accounting department 104 0.4% 
Hotlines 6,137 25.0% 
HR 1,825 7.4% 
Internal audit 341 1.4% 
Legal division 2,435 9.9% 
Ombudsperson 757 3.1% 
Security office 275 1.1% 
Supervisors 3,819 15.6% 
Third Party 833 3.4% 
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Total 24,534 100.0% 
What is the 
reporting media? 
 
Email 792 15.8% 
Fax 406 8.1% 
Mail 998 19.9% 
Phone 1,721 34.4% 
Text 6 0.1% 
Website 1,083 21.6% 
Total 5,006 100.0% 
    
Investigation procedures, wrongdoer disciplinary action, and anti-retaliation policy  
Investigation 
procedures 
Investigation procedures-general statement 1,903 32.1% 
Investigation procedures-witness cooperation 1,002 16.9% 
Investigation procedures-witness no misleading 
information 382 6.4% 
Investigation procedures-punishment of witness 
misleading investigation 177 3.0% 
Investigation procedures-corrective action 
mentioned 204 3.4% 
Investigation procedures-external investigation 
issues(government) 776 13.1% 
Investigation procedures-confidentiality and 
anonymity 1,484 25.0% 
Total 5,928 100.0% 
Wrongdoer 
 
Wrongdoers-including failure to report 245 6.3% 
Wrongdoers-including manager failure to detect 65 1.7% 
Wrongdoers-include managers’ ignorance 233 6.0% 
Mention of disciplinary action 1,415 36.6% 
Mention of disciplinary action-Termination of job 1,227 31.8% 
Mention of disciplinary action- legal punishment 559 14.5% 
Mention of disciplinary action- Monetary loss 117 3.0% 
Total 3,861 100.0% 
Anti-retaliation 
policy 
 
Protection from retaliation- General statement 3,371 46.6% 
Protection from retaliation- Good Faith 1,896 26.2% 
Protection from retaliation- Good Faith-definition 
of good faith 309 4.3% 
Protection from retaliation- Investigation 74 1.0% 
Protection from retaliation- list of retaliations 367 5.1% 
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be 
punished 646 8.9% 
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Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be 
punished-Job termination 416 5.7% 
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be 
punished-legal action 160 2.2% 
Total 7,239 100.0% 
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Table 2.4: Linguistic Characteristics in Companies' Internal Whistleblowing Policy 
Panel A: Linguistic Characteristics Percentage  
  
n (number of words) Percent 
Pronouns  
 
5,463 4.8% 
Uncertainty Words 
 
760 0.7% 
Linguistic Tone 
 
1,856 1.6% 
Total words in the policy  113,174 100.0% 
    
Panel B: Linguistic Characteristics within Pronouns and Linguistic Tone 
  
n (number of words) Percent 
Pronouns  First person 
singular 
1,588 29.1% 
First person plural 970 17.8% 
Total first person  2,558 46.8% 
Second person  2,332 42.7% 
Third person 
singular 
185 3.4% 
Third person plural 388 7.1% 
Total third person 573 10.5% 
Total pronouns 5,463 100.0% 
    
Linguistic Tone Negative 295 15.9% 
Positive 1,561 84.1% 
 
Total linguistic tone 1,856 100.0% 
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Table 2.5: The Content Characteristics in Executives' Opening Letter 
 
Executive letter(C-Coefficient) 
Importance of the policy  0.41 
Comprehension aid  0.01 
Who is covered by the policy? 0.13 
What is the responsibility? 0.41 
Where to report? 0.39 
What is the reporting media? 0.03 
Investigation procedures 0 
Wrongdoer disciplinary action 0 
Anti-retaliation policy 0.14 
  
  
Table 2.6: The Content Characteristics in Q/A Comprehension Aid 
 
Q/A(C-Coefficient) 
Importance of the policy  0 
Who is covered by the policy? 0.13 
What is the responsibility? 0.39 
Where to report? 0.39 
What is the reporting media? 0.03 
Investigation procedures 0 
Wrongdoer disciplinary action 0 
Anti-retaliation policy 0 
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Table 2.7: Percentage of Linguistic Characteristics in Each Content Characteristic 
Panel A: Percentage of Types of Pronouns in Each Content Characteristic 
  
First person Second person  Third person Total pronouns 
 
Total 
n n 
Percen
t 
(n/total 
n) n 
Percent 
(n/total 
n) n 
Percent 
(n/total 
n) n 
Percent 
(n/total 
n) 
Executives 
opening letter  
11,07
4 
81
7 7.4% 193 1.7% 37 0.3% 
1,04
7 9.5% 
Importance of 
the policy  4,555 
13
5 3.0% 69 1.5% 60 1.3% 264 5.8% 
Comprehension 
aid  
32,57
1 
95
2 2.9% 262 0.8% 97 0.3% 
1,31
1 4.0% 
Who is covered 
by the policy? 3,866 
10
9 2.8% 6 0.2% 32 0.8% 147 3.8% 
What is the 
responsibility? 
14,54
0 
21
4 1.5% 472 3.2% 
10
7 0.7% 793 5.5% 
Where to report? 
24,53
4 
13
1 0.5% 1,018 4.1% 
17
0 0.7% 
1,31
9 5.4% 
What is the 
reporting media? 5,006 27 0.5% 116 2.3% 6 0.1% 149 3.0% 
Investigation 
procedures 5,928 55 0.9% 103 1.7% 9 0.2% 167 2.8% 
Wrongdoer 
disciplinary 
action 3,861 39 1.0% 7 0.2% 12 0.3% 58 1.5% 
Anti-retaliation 
policy 7,239 79 1.1% 86 1.2% 43 0.6% 208 2.9% 
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Panel B: Percentage of Uncertainty Words and Linguistic Tone in Each Content 
Characteristic 
  Uncertainly Negative Positive 
 Total n n 
Percent 
(n/total n) n 
Percent 
(n/total n) n 
Percent 
(n/total n) 
Executives opening 
letter  11,074 27 0.2% 23 0.2% 304 2.7% 
Importance of the 
policy  4,555 11 0.2% 13 0.3% 30 0.7% 
Comprehension aid  32,571 38 0.1% 36 0.1% 334 1.0% 
Who is covered by 
the policy? 3,866 10 0.3% 0 0.0% 31 0.8% 
What is the 
responsibility? 14,540 119 0.8% 37 0.3% 227 1.6% 
Where to report? 24,534 271 1.1% 51 0.2% 228 0.9% 
What is the 
reporting media? 5,006 39 0.8% 2 0.0% 41 0.8% 
Investigation 
procedures 5,928 78 1.3% 23 0.4% 48 0.8% 
Wrongdoer 
disciplinary action 3,861 112 2.9% 93 2.4% 92 2.4% 
Anti-retaliation 
policy 7239 55 0.8% 15 0.2% 133 1.8% 
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Figure 2.1: The Overlaps Between Types of Pronouns and 
Content Characteristics
First person Second person Third person
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3.50%
Figure 2.2: The Overlaps Between Content Characteristics and 
Uncertainty words and Linguistic Tone
Uncertainty words Negative Positive
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Table 2.8: The Usage of Fictitious Third-person and Generic Third-person in Q/A 
 n (n= number of codes) Percent 
Fictitious third person 18 86% 
Generic third person 3 14% 
Total 21 100% 
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Appendix C 
 
 
TABLE 3.1  
Participant Demographic Information 
(all participants: n = 163) 
(successful participants: n = 136) 
Panel A: Means and Standard Deviation   
 
 
All Participants 
Retained 
Participants 
Age   
 Mean 27.8 28.1 
 Std. Dev. 6.9 7.1 
Years of Work Experience   
 Mean 5.1 5.5 
 Std. Dev. 6.0 5.9 
Panel B: Frequencies and Percentages   
  All Participants 
Retained 
Participants 
Gender   
 Female 48% 55% 
 Male 52% 45% 
Education   
 Undergraduate  32% 28% 
 Graduate 68% 72% 
Have discovered a person of greater authority 
engaging in questionable behavior?  
23.8% 25.2% 
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TABLE 3.2  
Descriptive Statistics for Exit Questions 
(Retained participants: n = 136) 
 
 
Mean (Std. 
Dev.) 
Panel A: Reporting Intentions   
How likely is it that you would report the CFO’s fraudulent act?  
(0–10, where 10 = definitely would report) 
8.26 (1.94) 
How likely is it that someone in Rowan’s position would report the CFO’s 
fraudulent act? (0–10, where 10 = definitely would report) 
6.34 (2.10) 
Panel C: Respondent Attitude Questions   
Please indicate the seriousness (i.e., the amount of harm done) by the 
fraudulent act in the case. (1-7, where 7 = very serious) 
6.03 (1.15) 
Please indicate Rowan’s personal cost of reporting the fraudulent act.  
(1-7, where 7 = very high) 
4.21 (1.97) 
Please indicate how likely it is that there would be negative repercussions for 
Rowan if he reports the fraud. (1-7, where 7 = very likely) 
3.87 (1.72) 
Please indicate the likelihood that reporting the issue would harm Rowan’s 
chances of being promoted at the firm. (1-7, where 7 = very likely) 
3.99 (1.77) 
Please indicate the likelihood that there would be any form of retaliation 
against Rowan if he reports the fraud. (1-7, where 7 = very likely) 
3.96 (1.64) 
Please indicate Rowan’s responsibility (duty or obligation) to report the 
fraudulent act. (1-7, where 7 = very high) 
6.41 (0.83) 
Please indicate the likelihood that you believe the company will thoroughly 
investigate the act if it is reported. (1-7, where 7 = very likely) 
4.93 (1.49) 
Please indicate the likelihood you believe the company will correct the 
questionable act if the act is reported. (1-7, where 7 = very likely) 
4.94 (1.48) 
Please indicate the level of disciplinary action facing the CFO if the 
questionable act is reported.  (1-7, where 7 = very high) 
5.39 (1.52) 
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TABLE 3.3 
Language Vividness and Risk Aversion 
(Retained participants: n = 136) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics    
 
 
Mean   
(Std. Dev.) 
Factor 
loading 
Language Vividness    
1. How precise XOTLE’s policy for reporting unethical conduct is?  
(1-7, where 7 = very precise) 
5.43 (1.35) 
0.88 
2. How clear XOTLE’s policy for reporting unethical conduct is?  
(1-7, where 7 = very clear) 
5.59 (1.42) 
0.88 
3. How specific XOTLE’s policy for reporting unethical conduct is?  
(1-7, where 7 = very precise) 
 5.20 (1.54)  
0.88 
4. Do you feel that XOTLE’s policy for reporting unethical conduct is 
applicable to you? (1-7, where 7 = very applicable) 
5.44 (1.35) 
0.51 
Risk Aversion   
1. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. (G)  1.41 (0.93)  0.82 
2. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual 
fund. (I) 
 5.21 (1.55)  
0.09 
3. Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game. (G)  1.75 (1.37)  0.80 
4. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. (I)  3.47 (1.71)  0.25 
5. Betting a day’s income at a sporting event. (G)  1.81 (1.40)  0.81 
6. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture. (I)  4.23 (1.74)  0.33 
Panel B: Measurement Reliability   
 Number of 
Items 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
(standardized)   
Language Vividness  4 0.81  
Risk Aversion 3
9 0.76  
    
Note: I = investment, G = gambling   
        
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Weber et al. (2002) documented that the difference between these two domains is the level of control over the risk, 
and financial gambling risk is less controllable than financial investment risk. In our study, the risk involves the 
possibility of retaliation from the firm, which is difficult to control. Thus, I retain only the financial gambling risk 
domain items (the first, third, and fifth item) for future analysis.   
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TABLE 3.4 
Panel A: Means (Std. Deviation) for Reporting Likelihood  
  
   
Anti-retaliation Policy 
   
First-person Pronoun Third-person 
Pronoun 
Total  
Reporting Policy First-person 
Pronoun 
8.65(1.59) 8.51(1.76) 8.57(1.67)  
n = 34 n = 35 n = 69 
 
Third-person 
Pronoun 
7.71(2.22) 8.15(2.09) 7.93(2.15) 
 
n = 33 n = 34 n = 67 
 
Total 8.19(1.97) 8.33(1.92) 
 
 
n = 67 n =69 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results 
  
Source Sum of 
Squares  
df  Mean 
Square  
F  Sig. 
 
Corrected Model 17.70 3 5.90 1.58 0.2
0 
 
Reporting Policy 
Pronouns 
14.41 1 14.41 3.87 0.0
5 
 
Anti-Retaliation 
Policy Pronouns 
0.78 1 0.78 0.21 0.6
5 
 
Reporting Policy 
Pronouns *    
Anti-Retaliation 
Policy Pronouns 
 
 
2.74 
 
 
1 
 
 
2.74 
 
 
0.74 
 
 
0.3
9 
 
Error 491.29 132 3.72 
   
Total 9790.25 136 
    
Corrected Total 508.98 135 
    
Dependent Variable: ‘‘How likely is it that you would report the CFO’s fraudulent act?’’ 
scaled using an 11-point ascending scale (endpoints labeled ‘‘Extremely Unlikely’’ and 
‘‘Extremely 
Likely’’). 
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-0.31* 0.55*
-.31* (-.14)
*p < 0.05
Figure 3.1: Standard regression coefficients for the relationship between Reporting Policy 
Pronouns and Reporting Intentions as mediated by Language Vividness. The standardized 
regression coefficient between Reporting Policy Pronouns and Reporting Intentions, controlling 
for Language Vividness, is in parentheses. 
Language 
Vividness
Reporting Policy 
Pronouns
Reporting
Intentions
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XOTLE, Inc. Overview 
XOTLE, Inc. is an oilseed refining company that was founded in 1987. The company 
employs approximately 2,000 employees and is listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Over 
the past few years, the company’s operating results were steady and slightly below the industry 
average.  
Rowan Geoffrey is an accountant who works in the Finance department of XOTLE, Inc. 
Rowan’s responsibilities include booking and recording accounting entries related to operating 
expenses and preparing related operating financial reports. After finishing his financial reports, 
he sends them to Gilbert Elias, the CFO of the company, for review.  
On January 4th, 2014, Rowan was looking over 2013’s financial report. He realized that 
the marketing expenses number was significantly lower in the final financial report than what he 
originally reported to Elias (the CFO). Rowan went back to review the entries and found that a 
significant amount of marketing expenditures were capitalized as assets rather than being 
expensed. In his original work, Rowan had recorded all of these marketing expenditures as 
expenses. However, Elias reclassified the expenses as assets. Rowan had not received any 
notification or explanation for this change.  
In prior years, similar marketing expenditures were always expensed. No changes were 
made to the marketing strategy in 2013. According to U.S. GAAP, these types of marketing 
expenditures should be expensed. Capitalizing the marketing expenditures understated expenses 
and overstated profit. Further, due to the capitalization of the expenditures, the 2013 earnings per 
share (EPS) ratio increased from $0.89 to $0.91. Therefore, Rowan is fairly confident that Elias 
(CFO) engaged in fraudulent financial reporting by changing the classification of the marketing 
expenditures. 
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The following is XOTLE’s policy of unethical conducts reporting. 
Q: If I detect [an employee detects] unethical/fraudulent acts, what is my [his/her] 
responsibility to speak up? How should I [he/she] raise a concern? 
A: You [He/She] must speak up promptly if there is any reason to suspect that anyone in the 
company has violated company policies or local laws. Your [His/Her] report will be taken 
seriously and investigated appropriately. It is better to report a suspicion that turns out not to be 
an issue than to ignore a possible violation of the law or Company policy. 
To comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, XOTLE, Inc. maintains an anonymous reporting 
hotline for whistle blowers.  You are [He/She is] encouraged to call the hotline.  The hotline is 
administered by the internal auditors of XOTLE, Inc. The hotline is available 24 hours a day and 
365 days a year. The telephone calls made to the hotline are to be reported to the audit committee 
for further investigation. The identity and any information about the you [him/her] will be kept 
strictly confidential.  
 
Q: If I report [an employee reports] a fraud, will I [he/she] be protected from retaliation? 
A: All responses are kept anonymous. You [He/she] will not be subject to intimidation or 
retaliation. This includes being left out, managerial or coworker abuse, threatening behavior, 
harassment, loss of job or promotion, or any other professional, personal, or financial form of 
retaliation both now and in the future. 
If you believe [he/she believes] that you are [he/she is] being retaliated against, you [he/she] 
should report such conduct immediately to the Human Resources Department. Any individual 
who unlawfully discriminates or retaliates against you [him/her] as a result of the protected 
actions may be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including immediate termination. 
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PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS REGARDING THE CASE IN THE 
ORDER LISTED. DO NOT GO BACK AND CHANGE YOUR ANSWERS. YOU MAY 
REFER BACK TO THE CASE MATERIALS IF YOU WISH.  
  
FOR THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER OR OPTION 
THAT CORRESPONDS WITH YOUR ANSWER.  
 
1. Given this situation, how likely is it that someone in Rowan’s position would report the 
CFO’s fraudulent act? 
 
0%  10%  20%  30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  80%  90%  100% 
No Likelihood    Moderate    High 
Likelihood 
(Definitely would   Likelihood    (Definitely would 
not report)          report) 
 
2. Now imagine you are facing this situation. How likely is it that you would report the CFO’s 
fraudulent act? 
 
0%  10%  20%  30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  80%  90%  100% 
No Likelihood    Moderate    High 
Likelihood 
(Definitely would   Likelihood    (Definitely would 
not report)          report) 
 
3. How would you rate XOTLE’s policy for reporting unethical conduct? 
      Very Vague                   1            2            3             4            5             6           7     Very 
Precise 
             
      Very Unclear                1            2            3             4            5             6           7     Very Clear 
 
      Not at all Specific         1            2            3             4            5             6           7     Very 
Specific       
 
 
4. Do you feel that XOTLE’s policy for reporting unethical conduct is applicable to you? 
                      1                 2               3            4         5              6                
7      
          Not at all Applicable                                       Neutral                                            Very 
Applicable 
 
 
5. Does XOTLE have a reporting hotline for whistle blowers? Yes______  No ______ 
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6. Please indicate the seriousness (i.e., the amount of harm done) by the fraudulent act in the 
case. 
                      1                 2               3            4         5              6                
7      
          Very Low                                                         Neutral                                             Very 
High 
         
7. Please indicate Rowan’s personal cost of reporting the fraudulent act. 
                      1                 2               3            4         5              6                
7      
          Very Small                                                       Neutral                                            Very 
Large 
 
 
8. Please indicate how likely it is that there would be negative repercussions for Rowan if he 
reports the fraud.  
                      1                 2               3            4         5              6                
7      
   Very Unlikely                                            Neutral                                         Very Likely 
9. Please indicate the likelihood that reporting the issue would harm Rowan’s chances of being 
promoted at the firm. 
                      1                 2               3            4         5              6                
7      
   Very Low                                                   Neutral                                          Very High 
 
10. Please indicate the likelihood that there would be any form of retaliation against Rowan if he 
reports the fraud.  
                      1                 2               3            4         5              6                
7      
   Very Low                                                   Neutral                                          Very High 
 
11. Please indicate Rowan’s responsibility (duty or obligation) to report the fraudulent act. 
                      1                 2               3            4         5              6                
7      
   Very Low                                                   Neutral                                          Very High 
 
12. Please indicate the likelihood that you believe the company will thoroughly investigate the 
act if it is reported. 
                      1                 2               3            4         5              6                
7      
   Very Unlikely                                            Neutral                                          Very Likely   
 
13. Please indicate the likelihood you believe the company will correct the questionable act if the 
act is reported. 
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                      1                 2               3            4         5              6                
7      
   Very Unlikely                                            Neutral                                           Very Likely 
 
14. Please indicate the level of disciplinary action facing the CFO if the questionable act is 
reported. 
                      1                 2               3            4         5              6                
7      
   Very Low                                                   Neutral                                           Very High 
 
 
15. Please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity or behavior, and check the box 
the extent to which you agree.   
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 a. Betting a day’s income at the horse races.        
b. Investing 10% of your annual income in a 
moderate growth mutual fund. 
       
c. Betting a day’s income at a high-stake 
poker game. 
       
d. Investing 5% of your annual income in a 
very speculative stock. 
       
e. Betting a day’s income at a sporting 
event 
       
f. Investing 10% of your annual income in a 
new business venture 
       
 
16. What is your current age? ______ 
17. Please indicate your gender:         ________ Male        ________ Female 
 
18. Is English your first language?     ________ Yes          ________ No 
 
19. How many years of professional work experience do you have? _______ 
 
20. Which program are you in? 
B.S. in Accounting _____ 
Master of Accountancy _____ 
Post-baccalaureate certificate in Accounting _____ 
Master of Business Administration (MBA)_____ 
Other _____ 
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21. What is your highest level of education completed? 
High School _____ 
Some College _____ 
Associates Degree _____ 
Bachelor Degree _____ 
Some Graduate School _____ 
Master Degree or Higher _____ 
 
22. Do you hold any of the following designations? (Check all that apply) 
CPA _____       CIA _____        CMA_____             Other_____             None_____ 
23. Which group best represents your race or ethnicity?  
White___      Black/African American____      Asian_____     Hispanic_____     Other____ 
24. Have you discovered a person of greater authority engaging in questionable or wrongful 
behavior?     YES____        NO_____ 
If so, did you take action to report that behavior? 
YES____        NO_____       N/A_____ 
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